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In this case study I analyze partisan gerrymandering in the United States with the research 
question: Does partisan gerrymandering violate the Constitution of the United States of 
America? With this as a starting point I use the Supreme Court case of Gill v. Whitford about 
redistricting in Wisconsin as this studies case.  
 
I start off with an introduction to some views on representation that informs the conflict in the 
case. Whether one has a dyadic or collective view of representation could be a huge influence 
on ones opinion of gerrymandering’s legality. Then I go in detail on how the redistricting 
process works in the United States, some of the mechanisms in place to ensure a fair 
redistricting process and explain what gerrymandering is. I also present the parts of the 
American Constitution that partisan gerrymandering might be in violation of. To get 
background information on how gerrymandering is treated in the court system, I found it 
important to do a breakdown of the most important Supreme Cases on the field.  
 
Then I looked at the case at the center of my paper. The data I used in discussing and 
concluding on the issue is mainly collected through document analysis of the amicus briefs 
filed in Gill v. Whitford. I sorted the arguments in what I found to be the most important 
categories. The two main things the oral arguments and the amicus briefs seemed to focus on 
were the First Amendment and how a manageable standard would look like.  
 
I conclude the thesis as following: With Gill v. Whitford as the case of study, I find that 
partisan gerrymandering is a violation of the Constitution of the United States of America. It 
is probably not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
where my opinion is colored by how the Supreme Court has ruled in previous gerrymandering 
cases. However, I do believe that partisan gerrymandering violates the First Amendment and 
its freedom of association. I find that voting is a free speech activity and that when the state 
dilutes the vote of voters with a certain political leaning, it becomes a form of viewpoint 
discrimination. The First Amendment guarantees free expression and association, but partisan 
gerrymandering violates that when it is used to punish individuals for their viewpoint by 
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“Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, 
into a judicial question.”  
Alexis De Tocqueville – Democracy in America (1835), p. 110.  
 
Most democratic states today have a representative democracy, where professional legislators 
work fulltime with politics and make political decisions on the public’s behalf. The politicians 
who will serve as representatives are decided through elections by the public and the election 
process varies from country to country. One feature of electoral systems with single member 
districts is that in the process of drawing new electoral districts, parties or individuals might 
try to create a political advantage for themselves. This process is referred to as redistricting, 
but when it leads to an extreme partisan advantage for someone, it is called gerrymandering. 
The name comes from the United States and has been a feature of their political system for a 
long time. Gerrymandering is a very interesting phenomenon to me, as it is unlike anything in 
the Norwegian political system.  
 
The last 60 years have seen a number of Supreme Court cases in the United States where 
electoral districts, both congressional and state legislative, their representativeness and their 
constitutionality have been the central elements. The focus on my master thesis will be on 
partisan gerrymandering in the United States and whether it is in violation of the American 
Constitution. So far, it has been an area where the Supreme Court has not been willing to 
enter the political thicket and has left it to the states. With the case of Gill v. Whitford, dealing 
with a state legislature redistricting plan from Wisconsin, it seems like the Supreme Court is 
ready to take a stance. The plaintiffs claim that partisan gerrymandering is a violation of both 
their First Amendment right to association and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. My research question for the thesis will be:  
 
Does partisan gerrymandering violate the Constitution of the United States of America?  
 
There are conflicting views on how gerrymandered districts affect representation and whether 
those districts should be legal or if they violate the constitution. Congressional elections are 
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not competitions for statewide or nationwide seats; they are separate elections between 
separate candidates in separate districts. The same goes for elections to the state legislatures. 
However, one could also argue that the parties do not just compete for specific seats, but also 
for control of Congress and of state legislatures through having a majority of the 
representatives. Whether Congress as a whole represents the American people as a whole or 
whether each member of Congress only represents his or her particular district is at the center 
of the conflict of gerrymandering. Is it unconstitutional to give one party a partisan advantage 
by making the other party’s voters less effective in converting their votes into representatives 
on a statewide basis, as long as the district specific voting is equal? And if it is, how do you 
decide when the decisions made in a redistricting process are too partisan and it constitutes an 
unconstitutional gerrymander?   
 
Partisan gerrymandering has been a part of American politics for centuries, but it has become 
more controversial as other representative challenges like malapportionment and racial 
gerrymandering has been struck down by the judicial system. The partisan divide in the 
United States is increasing and gerrymandering is getting more sophisticated and effective 
with modern district drawing programs on computers. This has depleted the number of 
competitive congressional districts. It has also led to parties winning a clear majority of seats 
in Congress and state legislatures with a minority of votes. But can those institutions then be 
said to be representative? This question has become very relevant by an ongoing Supreme 
Court case on partisan gerrymandering.  
 
When the Supreme Court has dealt with previous cases of partisan gerrymandering, they have 
tended to say that it is necessary to produce a district-specific claim that violates the Equal 
Protection clause. What plaintiffs have argued is that the results of Congressional and state 
assembly elections as a whole can be used as evidence. The question of how to consider 
representation is made current in the ongoing case of Gill v. Whitford, where the hearings in 
the Supreme Court started at October 3. 2017.  
 
I plan to go through the history of partisan gerrymandering in the United States Supreme 
Court and end up with a close examination of Gill v. Whitford as the case I will study in 
detail. Following the introduction, chapter two will discuss representation, the Constitution, 
redistricting and gerrymandering. It will go in detail on two different views on representation, 
why a lack of representation is harmful and how the Supreme Court’s view of representation 
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could affect their ruling on partisan gerrymandering. Then it presents the parts of the 
Constitution that partisan gerrymandering could be violating and why. Next, I present the 
American redistricting process in detail and explain what gerrymandering is. In chapter three 
the research method of the paper and the reasoning behind it is presented. Chapter four goes 
through the history of gerrymandering in the Supreme Court and how the rulings have 
affected later redistricting. Then chapter five analyzes the case of Gill v. Whitford. First by 
going through the case process in the court system and then by looking at the amicus briefs 
filed in the case and group the arguments presented in seven main categories. In chapter six I 
discuss the findings from the case, bearing in mind the research question of “Does partisan 
gerrymandering violate the Constitution of the United States of America?” It is a discussion 
that looks at the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment to find out if partisan 
gerrymandering is a violation of those. It also becomes a discussion of other important 
questions the Supreme Court will have to decide on in Gill v. Whitford. Is partisan 
gerrymandering justiciable and could plaintiffs have a statewide claim? Then I consider how a 
manageable standard might look like. At the end, chapter seven concludes the findings in the 
paper.   
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2. Representation, redistricting and gerrymandering 
 
2.1 Representation 
Following the decisions in Wesberry v. Sanders and Reynolds v. Sims, it was assumed that 
mandated equal population districts would lead to equal representation. The term “equal 
population districts” is an objective term that can be easily measured, but “equal 
representation” is a much more subjective term that has a wished-for result. Whether they 
reach that result or not could be dependent on a lot of factors. Some of them are objective, 
like equal population districts, other are more subjective, like gerrymandering (Dixon, 1968: 
269). 
 
Representation provides you with a certain impersonalization, as one person, the legislator, 
stands in place of another, the voter. With representation, you also get a higher degree of 
inexactness, since a single legislator is incapable of subsuming in his being all of the 
conflicting aspirations of the electorate he stands in front of. The voters might have a large 
variance of opinions on any given issue, but their elected representative is only able to 
respond with a single voice – or abstain (Dixon, 1968: 24). As the legislator is such a crucial 
link between parties on the one hand and legislative action on the other, the legislative 
election process can play a very vital and determinative role. The whole range of 
apportionment, districting alternatives and practices are a part of it. With that perspective, the 
need of fair and effective representation entail a disposition to critically analyze the traditional 
ways legislative elections and districting has been performed, to evaluate how they fulfill the 
goals and to consider if there are possible modifications or alternative devices that has any 
merit (Dixon, 1968: 56).  
 
2.1.2 Different types of representation 
There are many ways to view representation, depending on the features one wishes to 
highlight. Pitkin defined political representation as, “a way to make the represented present 
again” (Pitkin, 1967: 10). In her seminal work on representation, she identified four main 
ways of looking at political representation in political literature: A formalistic view of 
representation that identifies representation with the formal procedures, like elections, used to 
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select a representative. A descriptive view that sees representatives as representing the people 
they resemble, which can refer to gender, race or class etc. In a symbolic view, the 
representatives “stand for” the people they represent as long as those people believe in them 
or accept them as a representative. The last view is a substantive view, where the 
representatives act in the interests of the people they represent (Pitkin, 1967: 11-12). 
 
A classic dilemma in representational theory has been whether a man who represents a 
particular constituency in the legislature has in his duty to pursue the constituency’s interests 
or the interest of the nation as a whole. It is important that local interests are not just overruled 
and sacrificed in favor of national interests. But at the same time, the representatives as a 
group has to look after national interests and make sure partial interests do not outweigh the 
needs for the whole nation (Pitkin, 1967: 215-216). The same goes for politics at the state 
level. Whether gerrymandering is viewed as something acceptable or viewed as breaking with 
fair representation could also depend what your view of representation is. As long as they 
follow traditional redistricting criteria like contiguity and compactness, most gerrymandered 
districts look acceptable. It is when you view it in combination with other districts in the state 
that the most advanced cases of gerrymandering really stand out. The norm in previous 
Supreme Court cases dealing with gerrymandering has been to consider the individual 
districts of the plaintiffs. One of the questions the Court will have to answer in Gill v. 
Whitford is whether voters from just 11 state legislative districts have the standing to 
challenge the entire Wisconsin Assembly map. The state argues that any harm the plaintiffs 
have suffered has only been in the district that they live or vote. The plaintiffs claim that the 
voter dilution is statewide and not district-specific, which makes their gerrymandering claim 
statewide. I will now go more in detail on these two ways to look at representation.  
2.1.3 Dyadic representation 
If representation is observed in an electoral context, then citizens can be said to be represented 
by an elected official that they could have voted in favor of or against. In this sense, an 
American voter in only represented by, for instance, one member of the House of 
Representatives and one member of the State Assembly, but none of the Supreme Court 
justices. The maximum degree of representation, according to the dyadic model of 
representation, would occur if legislators followed the wishes and preferences of their 
constituents. Candidates who run for office in individual constituencies have a clear 
motivation to provide dyadic representation for their district and prove that they in particular 
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look out for their constituency. This can be done through representing the policy issues that 
the district care about, but also by providing money to the district through pork barrel or help 
individual constituents to obtain government services (Weissberg, 1978: 536-538).  
 
2.1.4 Collective representation 
The representation of an interest or opinion though, is theoretically independent of an 
electoral connection between the person with a preference and the legislator representing the 
preference. An individual’s interests could be represented in Congress by any of the 435 
members of the House and it is likely that the one who best represents an individual would 
change over time and depend on policy area. One example of how representation can be 
independent of the legislator one could have voted for was when northern black and liberal 
white Congress members were the ones who represented the preferences of disenfranchised 
black voters in the South during the 1950s and 60s. The idea of collective representation is 
that the legislators as a group of individuals collectively represent the people as a whole. 
Misrepresentation would occur if some of the interests and opinions of the political 
community is excluded or not accurately reflected in the legislature (Weissberg, 1978: 536-
538). Whether the state legislature as a whole represents the people of Wisconsin or whether 
each member of the legislature represents his or her particular district will be a central 
question for the Supreme Court when it comes to deciding if the plaintiffs have standing in 
Gill v. Whitford.  
 
2.1.5 Why a lack of representation can be problematic 
What you want from a legislator is ideally someone who can represent all of the diverse 
interests and groups within his constituency. However, with the increase in safe districts that 
has been the trend over several decades, many legislators are able to win elections by only 
paying attention to certain parts of the electorate. A problem with this is that when no return 
can be expected from voting, which is the reality for minorities in many safe districts, it 
becomes irrational to make the effort to vote. The result is a truncation of formal 
representation (Dixon, 1968: 31). 
 
All systems of representation aim to both be responsive to the popular feeling and provide 
power to govern efficiently. The latter is an important reason for why the majority rules, 
rather than legislative assemblies making decisions by total consensus. But even though 
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majorities rule, minority opinions should be heard and have the right to participate in the 
legislative deliberation process, where the majority on different issues may ebb and flow from 
case to case. Having a set of legislative districts, whether or not they are equal in population, 
where a political party consistently gets close to 40 percent of the vote, but rarely get more 
than 20 percent of the seats in the legislative assembly, denies effective political 
representation in terms of bargaining power to the mentioned minority. Another important 
element is that by denying a minority even its proper minority share of legislative influence, 
which might lessen their chance of ever getting to majority states and turn a state from a 
nominal two-party system to what in reality is a one-party system (Dixon, 1968: 437-438). 
 
2.1.6 Group Rights versus Individual Rights 
A dimension of redistricting cases that is relevant when considering representation is the 
group rights versus individual rights dimension. It follows political lines to some extent, with 
liberals being in favor of group rights, while conservatives oppose it. The two conceptions 
differ on whether they see redistricting controversy as affecting an individual’s vote or as 
diluting the voting power of a particular group. Still, the two views can come to the same 
result in redistricting cases, as some of the cases will go against both conceptions. An 
example of this is Reynolds v. Sims from 1964, where the Supreme Court both emphasized 
that the “weight of a citizens vote cannot be made to depend on where he lives”, but also that 
“in a society ostensibly grounded on representative government, it should seem reasonable 
that a majority of the people of a State could elect a majority of that State’s legislators” 
(Persily, 2005: 73-74). 
 
 
2.2 Constitutional challenges to gerrymandering 
 
2.2.1 First Amendment 
The First Amendment is one of ten amendments to the Constitution that makes up the Bill of 
Rights, which was adapted in to law in 1791. It says “Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances” (United States Bill of Rights, 1789). The plaintiffs in 
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Gill v. Whitford have held up the First Amendment and specifically the freedom of 
association and it will be the first partisan gerrymandering case where the Supreme Court has 
to consider the question. It is also the main focus of Benisek v. Lamone, the second partisan 
gerrymandering case that the Supreme Court will decide in 2018. Both cases involve claims 
that the state government have violated their First Amendment rights by punishing them for 
expressing their political views at the ballot box, through a gerrymandered legislative map 
that makes their votes less worth than those of the other party.  
 
2.2.2 Fourteenth Amendment 
The Equal Protection Clause is found in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, which took effect in 1868. The motivation behind the Fourteenth Amendment 
was to put more constitutional restrictions against the states in the aftermath of the American 
Civil War and validate the equality provisions provided by the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 
Section 1 of the amendment says the following: “All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law” (Fourteenth Amendment, 1868). The emphasis 
in italics is added by me and highlights the Equal Protection Clause. The first application of it 
to voting law came with the case of Baker v. Carr, and it has since been used to equal voting 
rights further in other Supreme Court cases. It is one of the claims the plaintiffs have raised in 
Gill v. Whitford and will be an essential question for the Supreme Court to decide on. I will 
review those cases and their use of the amendment later in the paper. 
 
When the Supreme Court makes a ruling on the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering, 
it will be the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment that they will have to 
consider. The District Court found Wisconsin’s Act 43 to be in violation of both. In the 1986 
redistricting case of Davis v. Bandemer, which will be discussed later, it was ruled that 
partisan gerrymandering could violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment if it intentionally and effectively discriminated against an identifiable political 
group, for instance members of a political party. In that instance though, they did not find a 
violation and the Supreme Court has not been able to find a clear standard for deciding if the 
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equal protections of the law has been broken. Many gerrymandering cases has been litigated 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, but in the 2004 gerrymandering case of Vieth v. Jubelirer, 
which is also discussed later, Justice Anthony Kennedy suggested that a suitable standard 
could rather be found in the First Amendment. Violations of the amendment could take place 
when an apportionment has the purpose and effect of burdening a group of voters’ 
representational rights. Gill v. Whitford will now give the Supreme Court a chance to consider 
if partisan gerrymandering violates the First Amendment freedom of association.  
 
2.3 Redistricting and gerrymandering 
2.3.1 What does the constitution prescribe? 
Article 1, section 2, of the United States Constitution tells us that the people of the several 
states shall choose the members of the House of Representatives every second year. After 
much debate on how to distribute the representatives, it was decided that “Representatives and 
direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this 
Union, according to their respective Numbers, [which shall be determined by adding the 
whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and 
excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons]. The actual Enumeration shall be 
made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and 
within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct” 
(Constitution of the United States of America, 1787).  
 
2.3.2 Redistricting  
The United States conducts a census every 10 years. After counting every resident, the 
number of congressional seats every state will have is decided and this is called 
apportionment. The total number of representatives in the House is 435 and every state gets at 
least one representative, while the 385 others are apportioned after the state’s share of the 
population. Seven states are only represented by one member of Congress, due to their low 
population. Following the census, states that have gained population can be entitled to 
additional representation and will get new congressional districts. However, since the number 
of congressional representatives is restricted to 435, this means that the states that have lost 
people or had less growth will lose congressional districts. The creation of new seats, or the 
loss of an old one, affects all districts in the state. Even states that do not add or lose 
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congressional districts need to redraw their districts, to adjust for population shifts within their 
borders (Draper, 2012).  
 
The same modifications must be performed on districts for state legislatures and local 
jurisdictions as well. How the districts are drawn will be an essential part of the political 
“rules of the game” for the rest of the decade, which makes the process of drawing up the 
districts meta-political (Cain, 1984: 5-6). Richard L. Morrill (1987: 242) states that the goal of 
districting is “to make possible the meaningful and effective participation of voters in electing 
individuals who meet these three senses of representation – party, place, and, if appropriate, 
race.” The essential part is that voters feel like their vote matters. Poorly executed 
redistricting can lead to disenfranchisement and a feeling of not being represented. Over time, 
this could lead to lower voter participation, reduced trust in government and a lower quality of 
representation and of governance. 
 
The United States is in many ways an outlier in the democratic world in the way politicians 
play a major role in shaping the rules that affect their electoral future. Nonpartisan actors and 
professional bureaucrats play less of a part, while electoral rules, administration and campaign 
financing is handled by highly partisan actors. The electoral rules are a part of the same power 
struggle as the elections and the policy. The system is designed with the acknowledgement 
that many politicians will act in their own interests. It tries to channel that behavior in a way 
that may serve the publics wishes and goals through its institutions and pluralistic interest 
group environment, rather than deny that the self-interest is there (Mann, 2005: 93-94).   
 
2.3.3 The purpose of the House of Representatives 
The current method of redistricting creates a large number of uncompetitive congressional 
districts, where only one of the political parties has a chance of winning. Even though the 
Congress has a very low approval rating, the incumbents keep being reelected at very high 
rates. Though it should be noted that most voters like their own congressional representative a 
lot more than Congress as a whole, even a wave election like 2010 did only result in 63 seats 
that changed from one party to the other! This makes it harder for voters to demonstrate their 
displeasure with a political party and if the electoral system is not an effective way to express 
ones opinion of a political party, then there might be a flaw in the democratic process 
(Kamarck and Buchler, 2017: 232). 
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The Congress of the United States was created with two houses, the Senate and the House of 
Representatives, each with particular purpose. State legislators chose the Senate for a period 
of six years, so it had some distance to the “common people” and provided stability. The 
people elected the House of Representatives for shorter periods of two years. This gave it the 
purpose of reflecting changes in the will of the people and serve as a direct way to influence 
(Kamarck and Buchler, 2017: 232).  
 
In the vast majority of elections since 1950, more than 90 percent of House incumbents held 
on to their seats. While there is usually a strong advantage in being an incumbent with regards 
to name recognition and money, the number of safe seats has increased. The average 
percentage of House incumbents who won with at least 60 percent of the major-party vote 
was at 64 in the 1960s, but has increased to 80 in the 2000s (Kamarck and Buchler, 2017: 
235). The development with an increase in safe seats, both due to the increased importance of 
incumbency and because districts drawn to keep a representative safe, makes the House of 
Representatives less responsive to changes in the popular will. This goes against what the 
founding fathers saw as its purpose.  
 
2.3.4 What is gerrymandering? 
The term gerrymander has its origin in Massachusetts in 1812. The redistricting of the state 
led to weirdly shaped districts, separated towns and split many counties. The outer district of 
Essex county had the oddest shape of them all. As the new map was discussed at a dinner 
party in Boston, someone remarked that the Essex district only needed wings to resemble a 
prehistoric monster. They named it as salamander and combined the name with Governor 
Gerry’s name, since he had let the bill become a law. The artist Elkanah Tisdal illustrated the 
districts resemblance and it was printed in the Boston Gazette on March 26 1812. The term 
was quickly picked up by the Federalist press and used for campaign purposes (Griffith, 1907: 




Figure 2.1: Original cartoon of ”The Gerry-Mander”. Originally published in the Boston 
Centinel (Tisdale, 1812).  
 
 
Following the census performed every 10 years, all 50 state legislatures have to redraw the 
borders of their congressional and state legislative districts to they account for population 
movement and make sure the districts have as equal population as possible, in accord with the 
Supreme Court’s “one person, one vote” rule. As most state legislatures perform the 
redistricting themselves, it gives an opportunity for political parties to make changes that are 
to their own advantage. This phenomenon of manipulating the redistricting process to make 
sure your own party wins a lot more districts than the popular vote of the state suggests, is 
called gerrymandering. When this tinkering is done to benefit one party, it is often referred to 
as partisan gerrymandering, but there are also instances where the major parties cooperate to 
create a district map that can benefit both, for instance by protecting incumbents. Those 
instances are called bipartisan gerrymanders (Wofford, 2014).  
 
To maximize the number of seats their party can win, partisan map drawers will employ 
gerrymandering tactics that “wastes” votes from the opposition party. One of them is called 
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“packing” and is performed by concentrating the other party’s voters in a small number of 
districts to limit the number of seats they could influence. The amount of representatives won 
in single-member districts are the same regardless of margin of victory, so it is preferable that 
the opponent wins big in some districts and become less competitive in others. Another tactic 
is to break up a strong area for the other party and divide it across several districts so that they 
become a minority in each of them. This is called “cracking”. These tactics are often used 
together with great effectiveness. The optimal scenario is to make sure your preferred party 
has a safe majority, but not too big of a majority, of voters in as many districts as possible 
(Wofford, 2014).  
 
A good example of how this might look is the current congressional map in North Carolina as 
shown in Figure 2.2. The Republicans won 53 percent of the statewide popular vote in the 
2016 election, but came out of it with 10 out of 13 seats, or 77 percent. This was made 
possible after the 2010 election, when they were in charge of the redistricting process, as they 
controlled both chambers of the state assembly. This resulted in a map that used both packing 
and cracking. For example, the redistricted map included the entire city of Raleigh in the 
already heavily Democratic 4th District, while snaking the 2nd District around it to ensure a 
Republican majority there. It also exemplified cracking by splitting the mostly democratic 
city of Greensboro in half, which made it difficult for Democrats to compete in either the 13th 
or 6th District (Ingraham, 2018).  
 
 
Figure 2.2: Congressional Districts in North Carolina illustrating how packing and cracking 




Even if partisan map drawers would like to get creative, all 50 states include at least some 
traditional districting principles in their state constitution to put some limits on what kind of 
districts the state legislature can create. The phrase “traditional districting principles” was first 
used in Shaw v. Reno in 1993, a Supreme Court case dealing with racial gerrymandering in 
redistricting, but the actual principles are as old as the political system of the country and may 
have been called by a different name or taken for granted. Contiguity means that all parts of a 
district is physically connected, so that it is possible to travel to all parts of it without crossing 
the districts border. It is not always mentioned in state constitutions, but seen as a de facto 
requirement for districts. Another basic principle for districting is compactness, which limits 
how creative map drawers can be with their districts. A circle is considered to a perfectly 
compact shape, but many states already have irregularly shaped boundaries and 
municipalities. This makes it a complicated process to determine if a district breaks with the 
principle or not. Other things that need to be considered are the preservation of local political 
subdivisions and communities of interest. Most state constitutions do their best to minimalize 
the division of towns, counties and other municipal boundaries. Some also include language 
about protecting incumbents and the cores of prior districts. While it has less priority than 
most of the other principles, it is viewed as disruptive to the political process when 
incumbents are made to run against each other, though sometimes it is unavoidable, like when 
a state loses a congressional district following a census (National Conference of State 
Legislatures, 2010: 105-106). I will now expand on the discussion of some of the traditional 
redistricting principles.  
 
2.3.5 Contiguity 
A very simple idea in theory, contiguity means that all parts of the district are connected. In 
reality, this can be more problematic, as the addition of a thin connecting line could make a 
noncontiguous district into a contiguous one without changing the electoral make-up of the 
district. When the contiguity is stretched as far as possible, it can result in some rather odd 
shapes and lead to problems with compactness. Nevertheless, it can also be used as a tool to 
increase representation, as adding a thin connection between two minority-dominated areas 
could create a majority-minority district. Majority-minority refers to districts where one or 
more racial and/or ethnic minorities make up a majority of the population. Another problem is 
that a breach in contiguity is sometimes unavoidable due to geography, like islands of the 
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coast. This can cause a lack of contiguity even if there is no political manipulation behind it 
(Altman, 1998: 164).  
2.3.6 Compactness 
People have always had a problem with oddly shaped districts. Going all the way back to 
when the term gerrymandering was created, opponents of Governor Elbridge Gerry of 
Massachusetts criticized him for drawing a district that looked like a salamander, which they 
ridiculed by calling it a Gerry-mander. Oddly shaped districts are often seen as evidence of 
gerrymandering, and it can certainly be a visual indicator that something is suspicious, but 
compactness can sometimes be at odds with other goals like ethnic or political balance (Butler 
and Cain, 1985: 199). Justice Stevens mentioned this in his concurrence with the majority in 
Karcher v. Daggett, where he argued that geographic compactness was a guard against all 
types of gerrymandering and that “drastic departures from compactness are a signal that 
something may be amiss” (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2010: 109).  
 
While there are no formal standards for compactness, the shape of districts and how it affects 
the perception of fairness has been important factor in court rulings. Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor argued in a Supreme Court ruling from 1993 that ”Reapportionment is one area in 
which appearances do matter”, which played a big factor in striking down several majority-
minority districts in the 90s (Monmonier, 2001: 44). Deval Patrick, assistant attorney general 
for civil rights under president Bill Clinton and attorney general Janet Reno and later the 
governor of Massachusetts, said about oddly shaped majority-minority districts that: “I will 
admit that some of these look pretty strange to me as well, until you look around. A lot of 
majority-white districts are bizarre and these districts have not been affected by the Voting 
Rights Act.” “There’s no such thing as a “normal” or regularly shaped district”. The 
weirdness of many districts are most of all a reflection of the legislature’s eagerness to protect 
its own (Monmonier, 2001: 85).  
 
Others have argued that we should probably focus less on the shape and compactness of 
districts. While odd-looking districts have been derived and the media love to make fun the 
“snakes”, “earmuffs” and “Goofy kicking Donald Ducks”, we should be careful to assume 
that a checkerboard square is the ideal. That may cast attention in the wrong direction, 
towards superficialities like size and shape, rather than the political realities the districts form 
will produce. Form should not be confused with function. There are many factors to consider 
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in a redistricting process, like natural boundaries, minority representation, political balance 
and subdivisions, which could make an asymmetrical design the better option (Dixon, 1968: 
459).  
 
Therefore, definitions of gerrymandering that focuses on shape are a bit misleading. The 
concept should include all apportionment and districting arrangements that transform one 
party’s actual voting strength into the maximum number of legislative seats and transform the 
other party’s actual voting strength into the minimum number of legislative seats. Dixon 
(Dixon, 1968: 460-461) would include all discriminatory districting in this category, even if it 
were simply a result of non-action, when the result is racial or political malrepresentation. The 
reality is that weird shaped districts could be part of facilitating an unfair advantage for a 
party over the other, but it could also be a way, short of proportional representation, to avoid 
wasted votes by recognizing some safe areas for the weaker party.  
 
 
Figure 2.3: Maryland’s 3rd Congressional District is one of the most gerrymandered and least 
compact districts in the United States. Source: (Ingraham, 2014) 
 
 
2.3.7 Communities of interest 
Another factor that goes into the redistricting process is communities of interest, which can be 
an ambiguous concept. It is generally viewed as traditional neighborhoods or communities 
with common interests, but some states like Colorado are more specific in their description: 
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“ethnic, cultural, economic, trade area, geographic, and demographic factors”. Only three 
states specifically mentions communities of interest in their constitution, but around half of 
them require consideration of communities of interest in congressional or state legislative 
redistricting (Cain, Donald and McDonald, 2005: 19).  
 
2.3.8 Gerrymandering as a “political question” 
Many of those who are opposed to a Supreme Court ruling in favor of restricting 
gerrymandering will argue it is a political question that should be resolved by state 
legislatures and not the judicial system. The concept of the “political question” is a tantalizing 
constitution law principle, and hard to define, as it cannot really be said to be a principle at 
all. It is in many ways a rule of expediency rather than a rule of reason, as it is designed to 
cover areas where the judicial wisdom might fail for a lack of guiding standards or the judicial 
power might lack a way to shape or enforce a solution. Evil tongues may say that it is a self-
imposed limitation, which justifies disengagement from a case or an issue by the judicial 
branch (Dixon, 1968: 101).  
 
2.3.9 Polarization 
Partisan gerrymandering is considered by some to be a contributing factor to the polarization 
we see in American politics today. A safe district usually means that the hardest fight could 
come in the primary election. The primary voters are just a small percentage, in the single 
digits, of the voting-age population and are made up by the hardcore ideologues of each party. 
Focusing an inordinate amount of attention on these voters and not the constituency as a 
whole, could certainly widen the gap between the political parties and explain why a lot of 
Americans feel like politicians ignore the issues that matters to them (Kamarck and Buchler, 
2017: 235).  
 
However, the same polarization also seem to take place where partisan gerrymandering is not 
possible, like statewide elections for senate and in states with only one congressional 
representative. This indicates that other factors also contribute to the trend of more safe seats. 
One of these is that Americans seem to segregate themselves voluntarily into communities 
with others who are similar to them economically, culturally and politically. This reduces the 
amount of competitive seats that can be drawn (Kamarck and Buchler, 2017: 236).  
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Partisan control over the process of redistricting has been shown to have considerable and 
lasting implications for the electoral fortunes in state legislative elections. The extent of the 
effect partisan gerrymandering has on elections to the U.S. House of Representatives is more 
disputed (Seabrook, 2010: 1). 
 
Some argue that partisan redistricting creates rigid conservative and liberal districts, where 
the general election becomes less important and the primary contests are where things are 
decided. As primaries become the main battleground, it becomes a race to the extremes. This 
will lead to less cooperation across the aisle and a politically crippled Washington, because 
the congressmen know that compromising can lead to them getting challenged in their 
primary elections (Draper, 2012). 
 
Congress has clearly become more polarized in recent decades. A comparison between the 
83rd congress from 1953-54 and the 113th congress from 2013-14 shows a lot fewer 
congressional representatives who are close to the center ideologically in the 113th.  However, 
if moderate politicians are a result of competitive districts and the lack of competitive districts 
are a result of gerrymandering, then we should still expect the representatives from 
competitive districts in the 113th congress to be as moderate as the representatives from 
competitive districts in the 83rd congress. It does however seem to be the case that members 
from marginal districts have become more polarized as well, so it is hard to blame 
polarization on a lower number of competitive districts. The same polarizing trend is also 
there in the Senate and the senators are elected by whole states and not subjected to drawn 
districts (Kamarck and Buchler, 2017: 244-245).   
 
2.3.10 Independent commissions 
Due to the partisan competition and the lack of competitiveness in many districts, some states 
have chosen to take the redistricting process away from the legislators and turn it over to a 
nonpartisan body. Hawaii, Iowa, Washington and Montana were the first states to establish 
independent redistricting commissions in the 1980s, and were later followed by Idaho, 
Arizona, New Jersey and California. Alaska, Pennsylvania, Colorado, Arkansas, Ohio and 
Missouri have established bipartisan or nonpartisan commissions as well, but only for their 
state legislature districts. The Supreme Court ruled this kind of independent redistricting 
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commission constitutional in the case of Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission in 2015 (Kamarck and Buchler, 2017: 236).  
 
2.3.11 Bipartisanship 
While partisan gerrymandering can be bad for voters, some would argue that bipartisan 
gerrymandering is more effective in serving the voter’s interests than competitive districts 
(Kamarck and Buchler, 2017: 243). Competitive districts needs to be politically diverse, but 
districts that are a result of bipartisan gerrymandering are usually more homogenous. This 
makes the gap between the primary and the general electorate smaller, so that the elected 
representative is likely to be closer ideologically to his constituents. You could also argue that 
a politically diverse district ensures that no matter who wins, a large part of the constituency 
will disagree with their views (Kamarck and Buchler, 2017: 247).  
 
As in many other aspects of American politics, race has been a factor in many gerrymandered 
district plans. Both major parties have at times done their best to suppress the voting power of 
minorities, especially in the south where blacks and hispanics make up a larger percentage of 
the population. A lot of it is due to racism, plain and simple, but there is also a partisan 
element to it.  
 
Following the civil war, blacks overwhelmingly supported the Republican Party, but voter 
suppression after the Reconstruction ended made the south solidly Democratic. As the 
decades went by, the Democratic Party started to align themselves more with the civil rights 
movement and started to receive a large majority of black votes, while the Republican Party 
became more popular with southern whites. This led to some bipartisan cases like Georgia v. 
Ashcroft from 2003, where a Republican-controlled Department of Justice argued that the 
new state senate district plan did not concentrate black voting strength enough. Concentrating 
more black voters in a district would increase the chances of a minority candidate, but would 
also weaken the Democratic voting power overall in the state (Issacharoff, 2015: 1399).  
 
This is an example of several cases where a bipartisan coalition of minority Democrats has 
cooperated with Republicans in redistricting efforts that benefit both. At other times, 
gerrymandering to get a partisan advantage has diminished minority-voting power. These 
cases blur the line between racial gerrymandering and partisan gerrymandering and have 
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caused the Supreme Court some headache. Hunt v. Cromartie saw the Supreme Court 
approve a racially focused gerrymandering of a congressional district, due to the argument 
that it was done as legal partisan gerrymandering rather than illegal racial gerrymandering 





3. A Case Study 
 
3.1 Case study 
A case study can be, and has been, defined in many different ways, depending on what the 
researcher have in mind and wants to emphasize. Gerring (2006: 20) defines a case study as 
“A case study may be understood as the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of 
that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larges class of cases [a population].” What 
makes a case study different from an experiment is that the former investigates a 
phenomenon, as it exists in its context, while the latter tries to isolate the phenomenon from 
the context it exists in. Yin (2003: 18) gives a definition that addresses that separating the two 
can be challenging: “A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. Both of these definitions emphasizes that 
case studies investigates a phenomenon thoroughly and in great depth. The term “case study” 
also implies that the case or unit being investigated might not be perfectly representative of 
the population. Social science rarely deals with phenomena that are completely identical, as 
the contexts around them are rarely identical. This is fine, but makes it important to have 
some skepticism about the bias the may be contained in a small sample of units (Gerring, 
2006: 20). One of the most important parts of designing research is to select a research object 
or case and find a research problem that you would like to investigate. It is of great 
importance to have a well-reasoned statement of the problem, to identify gaps in the current 
knowledge, acknowledge contradictory theories and remark on any lack of evidence for 
existing theories (George and Bennett, 2005: 208). 
 
Case study as a method has some clear strengths that makes it valuable. As Gerring phrases it: 
“the subjectivity of case study research allows for the generation of a great number of 
hypotheses, insights that might not be apparent to the cross-case researcher who works with a 
thinner set of empirical data across a large number of cases and with a more determinate 
definition of cases, variables and outcomes” (Gerring, 2006: 41). The internal validity tend to 
be strong in case study research, as it is easier to establish the veracity of causal relationship 
when you focus on a single or a small number of cases, rather than a larger set of cases. When 
you try to analyze how something got from X to Y, it can be easier to identify the causal 
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mechanisms when you have a detailed study of one case instead of a cross-case study, though 
the disadvantage is that such a method makes it difficult to accurately estimate the causal 
effects (Gerring, 2006: 43-44).   
 
There are certainly some weaknesses as well with case study as a scientific method. While it 
can be a great method for generating hypotheses, it is less suitable for hypothesis testing. 
Because of the low number of units, the base for generalization is limited and there can 
possibly be problems with the representativeness. This can be a challenge in regards to 
external validity, since it can be hard to apply the findings to a broader population when the 
study has only included a small number of cases (Gerring, 2006: 43). Though with case 
studies, the goal is not always to find the most representative example. Every case can be seen 
as something unique and scientifically interesting by itself (Grønmo, 2004: 90).  
 
3.2 Case selection 
According to Yin (2003: 39-42) there are five main justifications for choosing a single-case 
study. The first reason is when it is a critical case in testing aspects of a well-established 
theory. In this study, the case can contribute to confirming, expanding on or disprove a 
theory. Another reason would be that the case represents an extreme or unique case. As those 
cases are rare, there is often a lack of theories and existing literature on the field, which means 
that new information about it is needed. A third reasons for the selection of a case is that it is 
a representative or typical case. The goal is to gain knowledge about a common situation, how 
it unfolds and the conditions surrounding it. The fourth reason to choose a single-case study is 
that it allows the researcher to use a case as an exploratory device into a field or a 
phenomenon that is unexplored by social science. The fifth reason for it is that the case can be 
a pilot case that eventually becomes the first in a multi-case study. 
 
I find it hard to fit the case of Gill v. Whitford from Wisconsin very accurately into one of the 
categories. While partisan gerrymandering certainly has a large literature, this is a fresh case 
with some new features and is so current that not a lot has been written about it yet. It is a 
representative case in certain ways, as many of the complaints and issues are well known 
from previous Supreme Court cases. However, it is unique in terms of its new suggested 
standard, which utilizes new social science, and the Supreme Court has previously not ruled 
upon the claim that gerrymandering violates the First Amendment of the American 
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constitution. I think it is a very interesting case that highlights the issues of gerrymandering 
and why it has not been solved yet, with the possibility to have a big electoral influence in the 
United States. Advances in technology and scientific method has led to an increased use of 
partisan gerrymandering and it has become very relevant with the ongoing Supreme Court 
cases of Gill v. Whitford and the later added Benisek v. Lamone. It can be a critical case that 
leads to big and lasting political change in the USA and change how many people view 
representation.   
 
The case study is a method that can be very useful for an in depth study of a single unit or a 
small number of unites, where the goal is to gain greater knowledge about a larger population 
of unites. By looking at the case of Gill v. Whitford, I can analyze the arguments and goals 
being presented in this one case, and get a better understanding of partisan gerrymandering as 
a whole in the United States and its effect on representation. Why do some view it as a 
problem, how is its legal status debated and what solutions are being proposed? As this is not 
the first case involving gerrymandering that United States Supreme Court, I will look at older 
cases dealing with representation and gerrymandering, to establish a context and find out how 
they have affected the arguments and strategies used in this case. These are variables that 
could have been hard to investigate in a quantitative study, so the case study seemed like a 
suitable method based on what I want to do.  
 
3.3 Document analysis 
Document analysis is a form of qualitative research in which the analyst to assess a theme 
reviews documents and attempts to extract relevant data. There are three primary types of 
documents: Public records like annual reports and policy manuals, personal documents like 
journals and scrapbooks, and physical evidence or artifacts like flyers and posters (Bowen, 
2009: 28). The documents that I will analyze in this thesis are public records from the Gill v. 
Whitford case. I will go through the amicus curiae briefs filed in support of both parties and 
try to find the major points of contention and how they argue for and against. My reason for 
choosing to use amicus briefs as sources was to get an overview over the arguments used on 
both sides of the gerrymandering question. Using sources from a case shows the real life 
consequences and makes it less of a theoretical question.  
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As the amicus briefs are public documents used in the court system and available to everyone 
in the public, their authenticity is easily verified. It is important in a document analysis to 
evaluate the original purpose of the document, the agenda of the author and any bias they 
might have (Bowen, 2009: 32-33). That is less of an issue in this case, as the agendas of the 
parties filing briefs are quite clearly laid out in the arguments and they write down whom the 
brief is written in support of. Where the bias needs to be considered is with some of the 
sources used on redistricting theory and the constitutional history of gerrymandering, Bernard 
Grofman and Eric McGhee, who have also written amicus briefs to the Supreme Court in Gill 
v. Whitford. Both of them filed in support of neither party, but McGhee is one of the 
researchers behind the efficiency gap measure used in the case and Grofman was one of the 
researchers who suggested a test based on the partisan symmetry standard in a previous 
redistricting case called LULAC v. Perry from 2006. Another potential source of bias is the 
researcher himself. I was not very familiar with topic before I started writing this paper and 
do not feel very strongly either way. However, there could be negligence that results in 
misreading or wrong interpretation of former cases or amicus briefs. 
 
A case study goes in depth on a phenomenon and is likely to have a strong internal validity 
due to this narrow focus, while it can be more challenging to apply the findings on a broader 
population. This is a fresh case which utilizes new social science and is different from 
previous gerrymandering cases in its framing. It could potentially be a game changer in the 
field of redistricting and change how representation is viewed in the courts. The main 
analytical part of the paper is a document analysis of the amicus briefs filed in the Supreme 
Court case. However, as a case study is not isolated from the context it exists in, but is 
investigated as it is, it is necessary to investigate the context Gill v. Whitford exists in. I will 
go through the constitutional history of gerrymandering and look at the previous Supreme 
Court cases that have affected gerrymandering and representation. The starting point for these 
cases is Baker v. Carr in 1962. The reason is that this case established redistricting as an issue 
the courts could be involved in, starting what is sometimes referred to as the reapportionment 
revolution and helped establish the idea of a “one man, one vote” precept that would later be 




4. A Constitutional History of Gerrymandering 
 
4.1 Long history 
The practice of gerrymandering is almost as old as popular elections are in America and there 
are examples of it even from the colonial period. The first known appearance of it was in the 
drawing of assembly districts in Pennsylvania in 1705. This first instance of gerrymandering 
probably intended to equalize representation. By separating the city of Philadelphia from its 
county and give the rural districts their own representation, the hope was to give the rural 
counties equal influence, but the result was that Philadelphia’s political influence was 
excessively restricted. It did, however, not take long before politicians purposefully used 
gerrymandering for partisan purposes (Griffith, 1907: 26).   
 
New rounds of redistricting starts every 10 years following the census and the party in 
position in the state is likely to attempt to maximize their influence, following the existing 
rules and previous court decisions. A common pattern is that when new redistricting plans are 
implemented and their effect is felt, there will be some that complain and feel that their 
influence is marginalized by the new districting. Some of them will take their issue to the 
courts and the trend is that a few each decade will end up in the Supreme Court. How the 
courts rule in these cases will then affect the next round of redistricting. 
 
Table 4.1 below shows the most important Supreme Court cases since the reapportionment 
revolution started in the 1960s and how they affected districting and representation. In this 
chapter I will analyze the previous cases, because they established a framework and context 
that Gill v. Whitford exists in. The outcomes of these cases have influenced the strategies used 
later. The quote from de Tocqueville at the start of the thesis is exemplified in the table, 
where subjects that were previously considered political questions, like malapportionment and 
racial gerrymandering, have become things that the Supreme Court is willing to make rulings 
on. Partisan gerrymandering could be next.  




Year: Case: Question: Result: 
1962 Baker v. Carr Is redistricting a political question, or can it be 
resolved by federal courts? 
The first recognition that redistricting could be settled 
in court. It had previously been seen as a purely 
political issue, but the Supreme Court saw it as their 
responsibility to improve the quality of 
representation. 
1964 Wesberry v. Sanders + 
Reynolds v. Sims 
Do population discrepancies between 
congressional districts violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment and deprive citizens of the full 
benefit of their right to vote? Do discrepancies 
between state legislature districts? 
Established the concept of "one man, one vote", 
voting districts should be as equal as practicably 
possible in population. Asserted that the aim of 
reapportionment is to achieve a fair and effective 
representation for all citizens. 
1973 Mahan v. Howell A new state legislature plan was challenged as 
being unconstitutional because it's population 
deviations were to large to satisfy the principle 
of "one person, one vote". Was Virginia's 
reapportionment plan invalid under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment? 
Upheld a redistricting with significant population 
variance between districts, because the variance was a 
result of another redistricting criteria. In this case 
maintaining the integrity of political subdivision like 
cities and country lines. 
1983 Karcher v. Daggett Voters claimed the new congressional 
redistricting aimed to maximize Democratic 
power in the state. Did the gerrymandering in 
New Jersey's reapportionment plan violate 
Article 1, Section 2 of the Constitution, 
regarding equal representation? 
First time the Supreme Court writes explicitly about 
partisan gerrymandering. Important with fair, as well 
as equal representation.  
1986 Davis v. Bandemer A group of Democrats claimed political 
gerrymandering diluted their votes in important 
districts. Did Indiana's 1981 state 
apportionment violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? 
While the redistricting may have had a discriminatory 
effect on the Democrats, the effect was not 
sufficiently adverse to violate the Equal Protection 
Clause. But claims of partisan gerrymandering are 
probably justiciable and the courts can intervene to 
amend unconstitutional redistricting plans.  
1993 Shaw v. Reno Did the claim from North Carolina citizens, 
that the State had created a racially 
gerrymandered district, raise a valid 
constitutional issue under the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? 
Though the plan seemed neutral on its face, the 
districts shape was bizarre enough to indicate an 
effort to separate voters based on race. It was 
emphasized that strange district shapes are an 
indicator of districts drawn to include individuals 
with little in common other than one special feature.  
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1994 Vera v. Richards District Court case after Texas created three 
additional congressional districts, where some 
voters challenged the plans as racial 
gerrymandering. Did the plans violate the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment? 
The federal District Court found the plans 
unconstitutional as a racial gerrymander. They 
expressed a concern that partisan redistricting would 
lead to elections where the representatives have 
selected its voters, and not one where the voters select 
their representatives. 
2004 Vieth v. Jubelirer Can voters stop a redistricting plan by claiming 
it was manipulated for political reasons? Does 
a state violate the Equal Protection Clause 
when it disregards neutral redistricting 
principles to achieve an advantage for one 
political party? Does a state exceed its power 
under Article 1 of the Constitution when it 
draws congressional districts to ensure that a 
minority party will consistently win a super-
majority of the state's congressional seats? 
Decided not to intervene as no appropriate judicial 
solution could be found. Could not find a manageable 
standard for partisan gerrymandering claim, but gave 
indications that such a standard could be found and 
brought before the Court in the future. The Court 
ruled narrowly so the case did not overturn Davis v. 
Bandemer 
2006 League of United Latin 
American Citizens v. Perry 
Did the Texas legislature violate the 
Constitution and the Voting Rights Act when it 
used 2000 census data to redistrict in 2003 for 
partisan advantage, resulting in districts that 
did not conform to the one person, one vote 
standard? 
Supreme Court held that the plan did not violate the 
Constitution, but part of the plan violated the Voting 
Rights Act by redrawing a district in a way that 
denied Latino voters as a group the opportunity to 
elect a candidate of their choosing. The case made 
partisan symmetry an important part of the partisan 
gerrymandering discussion. Upheld that partisan 
gerrymandering is within the Supreme Court's 
domain. 
2017 Gill v. Whitford Does the Court have the authority to hear a 
statewide claim to Wisconsin's redistricting 
plan, rather than to specific districts? Is the 
redistricting plan an unconstitutional 
gerrymander, by violating voters' right to 
freedom of association under the First and 
equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendments? Did the District Court use an 
incorrect test for a gerrymander? Are partisan 





4.2 Baker v. Carr 1962 
One of the first steps in improving the quality of representation was the court’s recognition in 
Baker v. Carr in 1962 that malapportionment was an issue that could be settled in court. 
Malapportionment refers to electoral districts with divergent ratios of voters to 
representatives. Few rules had been established at the time and the disparity in representation 
and population of districts was big. It was even more lopsided in districts for the state 
legislature than in congressional districts, with ratios ranging from 2.2 for Hawaii to 1081.3 
for New Hampshire, where there had been no redistricting since 1900 (Monmonier, 2001: 23-
24). This meant that some electoral representatives were representing about a thousand times 
the number of voters as some other was. Or from a voter perspective, that voters in districts 
with less people per representative had a larger influence, per person, on the governing body. 
Rural districts tended to be overrepresented, while urban districts had a lot more people per 
representative. This was also the case in Tennessee and the background for why plaintiff 
Charles Baker brought his lawsuit to the courts. It was claimed that the apportionment of 
Tennessee’s state legislature failed to account for significant population changes, as it had not 
had a redistricting since 1901, and that this was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. An important reason for the Supreme Court’s decision in Baker 
v. Carr was the conviction that deferring to legislators in matters of reapportionment could 
have bad consequences, since those who possess disproportionate power in a legislature have 
no incentives to surrender it (Grofman, 2007: 14).  
 
Redistricting had previously been seen as a purely political problem, but the decision in Baker 
v. Carr was a reaction to representational issues that the political institutions seemed 
incapable of self-correcting. The decision made it clear that it was no longer just political, but 
was an issue where the courts could intervene. They could not have known how powerful the 
Equal Protection Clause would become in political reform. Looking at the court documents 
from the case, it appears that Chief Justice Warren was more focused on the principle of 
2017 Benisek v. Lamone Did the Maryland legislature violate voters 
First Amendment through partisan 
gerrymandering, by retaliating against them for 
past support of a party's candidate? 
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fairness and all votes to count equally, than he worried about political consequences of 
judicial intervention (Cain, Donald and McDonald, 2005: 8). Baker v. Carr was at the end of 
a long line of judicial refusals to enter the political thicket of reapportionment. The Supreme 
Court ruling that courts could take up challenges to unrepresentative legislatures under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment served to inaugurate a new era of 
constitutionalism and American Politics. This greatly affected legislative institutions, judicial 
review and political theories of representative government (Dixon, 1968: 99). 
 
4.3 Wesberry v. Sanders 1964 
The concept of “one man, one vote” was established as a rule for congressional districts in the 
case of Wesberry v. Sanders and for state legislature districts with Reynolds v. Sims in 1964, 
which led to a new wave of redistricting. These cases made it clear that population 
discrepancies between congressional districts and between state legislature districts could 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment and deprive citizens of the full benefit of their right to 
vote. Congressional districts today are very equal in population, as further cases have brought 
them to well below a 1 percent deviation, though local legislation districts are allowed to have 
a larger deviation if a good justification can be presented (Morill, 1987: 245).  
 
4.4 Reynolds v. Sims 1964 
Chief Justice Warren asserted in the Supreme Court opinion of Reynolds v. Sims that “the 
achieving of fair and effective representation for all citizens is concededly the basic aim of 
reapportionment” (Grofman, 2007: 11). The opinion suggests that fair and effective 
representation contains at least three components: political equality, majority rule rather than 
oligarchy and representative institutions that will reflect significant shifts in public opinion. 
Representative equality was seen as an important aspect of voting rights. This was a new 
interpretation, as the Supreme Court in the 1946 case of Colegrove v. Green had viewed 
legislative apportionment as a political problem of governmental structure, where the court 
should not interfere with the states decisions regarding their own institutions. Following 
Reynolds v. Sims, representative equality would be seen as a right that needed the same 
judicial protection as other guarantees of equality (Grofman, 2007: 12).  
 
Reynolds v. Sims was based on a case in Alabama, but had companion cases from several 
other states, including Colorado, once it reached the Supreme Court. From the Colorado case, 
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it was said by Justice Potter Stewart that the Equal Protection Clause in the constitution 
restricted state legislative apportionment in two ways: They had to be rational when looking 
at each state’s own needs and characteristics; and they must not be so constructed as 
“systematically to prevent ultimate effective majority rule”. It was expected that 
representative institutions would be responsive to shifts in public opinion; otherwise they 
would not be responsive to the popular will (Grofman, 2007: 13). 
 
4.5 Mahan v. Howell 1973  
In the Mahan v. Howell decision, the Supreme Court overruled a federal courts decision that a 
redistricting of state legislature districts in Virginia strayed too far from the principle of equal 
population. Even though the population variance between districts were 16.4%, the Supreme 
Court found it to be within constitutional limits, with the reasoning that the population 
variance was a result of a state policy of maintaining the integrity of political subdivisions 
like cities and county lines (Grofman, 2007: 17).  
 
In other state delegation cases the same year, with a smaller overall percentage variance in 
population, the Supreme Court held up the lower court’s decision that the reapportionment 
was insufficient. These cases differed from the Virginia case by not preserving local 
boundaries, which was the rationale for the population variance there (Grofman, 2007: 17).  
 
4.6 Karcher v. Daggett 1983 
New redistricting plans following the 1980 census brought several new charges of political 
gerrymandering. In the case of Karcher v. Daggett, the new map for New Jersey’s 1982 
congressional districts were invalidated on the grounds of population inequality, even if the 
variance ranged less than 0.70% at the most. Speaking for the majority opinion, Justice 
Brennan wrote, “the population deviations among districts, although small, were not the result 
of a good-faith effort to achieve population equality”. Any population inequality had to be 
proven justifiably by the state through other policies like district compactness or respecting 
municipal boundaries (Grofman, 2007: 120).   
 
Significant for later cases was the fact that the Supreme Court wrote explicitly about partisan 
gerrymandering for the first time and seemed more concerned with gerrymandering than 
having a completely equal population in the districts (McGhee & Stephanopoulos and 
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McGhee, 2015: 839). A theme in the opinions were the importance of fair representation in 
addition to an equal one, and that political gerrymandering could be a form of vote dilution. 
By manipulating district lines in favor of one party to an extreme degree, it treats voters 
unequally and could break with the right to fair representation of voters from the other party, 
which is protected by the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Stevens wrote in his opinion that 
“political gerrymandering is one form of ‘vote dilution’ that is proscribed by the Equal 
Protection Clause,” and added “The major shortcoming of the numerical standard is its failure 
to take account of other relevant – indeed, more important – criteria relating to the fairness of 
group participation in the political process” (Grofman, 2007: 20).  
 
Therefore, as Stevens explicitly mentioned partisan gerrymandering as a democratic problem, 
he also identified the problem of finding a numerical standard that considers all factors. What 
he proposed as a way to identify unlawful gerrymandering was to examine if the plan had a 
significant adverse impact on an identifiable political group, whether there was an objective 
indicator of this irregularity and if the State could provide convincing evidence that the plan 
still served the neutral, legitimate interests of the community, despite the irregularity 
(Stephanopoulos and McGhee, 2015: 840).  
 
4.7 Davis v. Bandemer 1986 
A federal District Court held in 1984 that the new redistrict plan for both chambers of the 
state legislature in Indiana was unconstitutional, by violating the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. They ruled that intentional partisan gerrymandering violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment right of the minority party in the state legislature. The case was 
appealed to the Supreme Court in 1986 and became one of the most important redistricting 
cases the Court has seen. While it did reverse the lower court’s decision that the redistricting 
map of Indiana was unconstitutional gerrymandering, it also confirmed that partisan 
gerrymandering was justiciable. This was decided when six of the justices agreed that 
gerrymandering was not a “political question”, but a “justiciable controversy” that the courts 
could intervene in to amend the situation (Stephanopoulos and McGhee, 2015: 840). Partisan 
gerrymandering had previously seemed immune to judicial scrutiny, but Davis v. Bandemer 
started the debate on what a test of unconstitutional political gerrymandering would look like 
(Grofman, 2007: 3).  
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Political scientists are split in how they interpret the ruling of Davis v. Bandemer. Some, like 
Lowenstein, argues that it preserves the status quo ante by keeping the door open for the 
possibility of court intervention in the very extreme cases, but rules out intervention when a 
major political party brings the litigation forward. Grofman on the other hand would argue 
that Davis v. Bandemer set the path for a three-pronged test for partisan gerrymandering. It 
must be proved to be intentional, severe and have predictably long-lasting consequences 
(Grofman, 2007: 5).  
 
The Democrats in Indiana, who were the minority party, did not show that the redistricting 
would have long-lasting consequences. The courts have taken the position that one cannot use 
the results of a single election to prove unconstitutional discrimination, it is necessary to 
prove that the plan consistently degrades voters’ influence. As Justice White said in the 
plurality opinion in Davis v. Bandemer:  
 
“The appellants argue here, without a persuasive response from appellees, that had the 
Democratic candidates received an additional few percentage points of the votes cast 
statewide, they would have obtained a majority of the seats in both houses. Nor was there any 
finding that the 1981 reapportionment would consign the Democrats to a minority status in 
the Assembly throughout the 1980s or that the Democrats would have no hope of doing any 
better in the reapportionment that would occur after the 1990 census. Without findings of this 
nature, the District Court erred in concluding that the 1981 Act violated the Equal Protection 
Clause” (Grofman, 2007: 6).  
 
Davis v. Bandemer set a standard that meant it was not enough to show an electoral 
disadvantage, you also had to prove that the disadvantage is durable and not a fluke in a single 
election. This would be something that parties in future redistricting cases would take note of. 
 
4.8 Shaw v. Reno 1993 
The 1990 redistricting increased the number of minority representatives in Congress by a lot. 
A stronger enforcement by the courts on population equality and against minority vote 
dilution, combined with new computer technology that made it easy to alternative districting 
plans, created a larger number of majority black or hispanic districts. New technology made it 
easier to draw creative maps with enough minorities inside the borders, but it also led to 
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complains about irregular shapes. The new districts had less emphasis on preserving city and 
county boundaries as well (Grofman, 1995: 27).  
 
Especially some of the oddly shaped black districts in the South led to a public, scholarly and 
legal backlash against the most creatively drawn minority districts. Some of the criticism 
came from the belief that it erodes a geographical based notion of representation. But for 
many others it is the use of any racial criteria for the drawing of districts, as that could lead 
away from a colorblind society to one where every group tries to grab their piece of the pie 
(Grofman, 1995: 27).  
 
In the case of Shaw v. Reno, a group of residents from North Carolina sued after the state had 
presented a redrawn district map with two majority-minority districts. The lawsuit was 
dismissed by a federal court, but was appealed to the Supreme Court who reversed the 
decision. The majority opinion written by Justice O’ Connor emphasized that strange shapes 
are an indicator of districts drawn to include individuals with little in common other than one 
special feature, in this case the color of their skin. The majority opinion held that redistricting 
based on race must be held to strict scrutiny, which means that it must satisfy three tests to 
pass. It must be necessary due to a compelling governmental interest, be narrowly tailored to 
achieve that interest and also be least restrictive way to effectively achieve that interest 
(Grofman, 1995: 29).  
 
4.9 Vera v. Richards 1994 
The District Court judges in Vera v. Richards from 1994 expressed concern over the voters’ 
ability to control their own democracy and made a strong argument for why they view it as 
important that gerrymandering remains justiciable. The fear is that partisan redistricting will 
lead to elections where the representatives have selected the people, and not one where the 
people select their representatives. This is a bigger concern in the American political system 
than in most other, since control of redistricting is mostly a partisan and political matter and 
not controlled by an administrative bureaucracy. Both the District Court and later the 
Supreme Court in 1996 rejected the district map as racial gerrymandering (Winburn, 2008: 3).  
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4.10 Vieth v. Jubelirer 2004 
Pennsylvania lost two congressional seats following the census in 2000. With Republican 
control in both houses of the state legislature and the governorship, they had the chance to 
create a new district plan that elected as many Republicans as possible. Three registered 
Democrats challenged the plan on several alleged violations of the constitution, including a 
claim of partisan gerrymandering. It was up to the Supreme Court to decide if the Equal 
Protection Clause is violated if neutral redistricting principles are disregarded to achieve an 
advantage for one party. They also had to consider whether congressional districts drawn to 
ensure that a minority party will consistently win a super-majority of the state’s congressional 
seats were in violation of a state’s power under Article 1 of the Constitution (Driver, 2005: 
1170).  
 
In what was the last large case on partisan gerrymandering before Gill v. Whitford, the 
Supreme Court found that districting plans could not be overturned just because they gave one 
party an advantage over another. The reason given by the five justices in the majority was that 
there was no standard found in the constitution and that all the suggested standards from the 
appellants and the dissenting justices was viewed as unmanageable (McGann, 2012). But the 
fifth justice in the majority, Justice Kennedy, was unwilling to close the door on the 
possibility that such a standard could be found and wrote in his concurring opinion “That no 
such standard has emerged in this case should not be taken to prove that none will emerge in 
the future” (Driver, 2005: 1173-1174). This indicated that Kennedy would be willing to adopt 
such a standard if it were to be brought before the Supreme Court. 
 
Kennedy also suggested that a justiciable standard might be found in the First Amendment, 
rather than in the Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment, under which most 
gerrymandering cases have been litigated. Justice Kennedy noted that “… First Amendment 
concerns arise where an apportionment has the purpose and effect of burdening a group of 
voters’ representational rights” and he argued that the First Amendment could prevent a state 
from punishing voters on the basis of their political party, in the same way a state cannot fire 





4.11 League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry 2006 
The Republican Party in Texas won total control of the state legislature after the 2002 election 
and sought to replace the redistricting plan that a federal court had drawn after the United 
States Census in 2000, with a plan that would increase the number of Republican 
representatives in Congress. A mid-decade redistricting is rare and not necessary as a result of 
the census, which means that it can come of as a more obvious political power grab and lead 
to bad publicity. In the League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry case, also referred 
to as LULAC, a group of voters alleged that a mid-decade redistricting was illegal, that the 
plan was an example of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, that it did not conform to 
the “one person, one vote” standard and that it violated §2 of the Voting Rights act, which 
prohibits any voting practice that has a discriminatory effect, regardless of whether there is a 
discriminatory intent. They claimed that the new map diluted the voting power of minorities 
in multiple districts, including District 23 that was redrawn to include more Republican Anglo 
voters and exclude Democratic Latino voters (Harvard Law Review, 2006: 243-244). 
   
When the case came before the Supreme Court in 2006, it ended up with a set of fractured 
opinions where the plurality affirmed the District Court’s decision to reject that the whole 
plan was an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander and that a mid-decade redistricting was 
illegal. But it did find that District 23 violated the Voting Rights Act (Harvard Law Review, 
2006: 243-244). Perhaps the most important influence on future cases was from the discussion 
on partisan symmetry.  
 
Vieth v. Jubelirer did cause some skepticism about whether any reasonable standard could be 
found, but a majority of the justices in LULAC v. Perry expressed interest in the concept of 
partisan symmetry. Symmetry in an electoral system indicates that parties in similar positions 
are treated equally, meaning that a party receives the same number of seats in the legislature 
as the other party would if they had the same percentage of votes. If the Democratic Party gets 
55 percent of the vote and that gives them 70 percent of the seats, you would expect the same 
result for the Republicans if they got the same. If it gave them less than 70 percent, it would 
mean that the district plan is asymmetric in favor of the Democrats, while more than 70 
percent would indicate that the plan is in favor of the Republicans. Many social scientists 
view partisan symmetry as the best way to define partisan fairness in a plurality-based system 
like the United States has (Grofman and King, 2007: 6).  
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One of the most prominent advocates for partisan symmetry was Justice Stevens, who defined 
it as a “requirement that the electoral system treat similarly-situated parties equally”. He 
applied partisan bias, a measure of partisan symmetry, which refers to the difference in the 
share of seats the two parties would receive given the same share of the statewide vote. 
Applying it on the Texas congressional map, it revealed that the Republicans would probably 
win thirty-two seats, 62.5 percent, if they got 50 percent of the voters, which would give the 
Democrats twelve seats, or 37.5 percent. This would give the Texas congressional map a 12.5 
percent pro-Republican bias (Stephanopoulos and McGhee, 2015: 843).   
 
Justice Kennedy did not approve of the partisan bias standard proposed, that would have 
compared how both parties would have fared electorally, when they were each given a certain 
percentage of the vote. It failed to satisfy his wishes for a standard, as he felt that it required 
counterfactual speculation and he disliked the assumptions one had to make about where the 
voters that would switch party resided. Another reason for Kennedy’s skepticism was that he 
wanted to see if the feared inequality would actually occur in an election and vary of 
invalidating a plan on hypothetical results. Lastly, none of the parties or amicus briefs had 
provided the empirical data on the level of partisan symmetry of other plans. Without that, the 
justice did not see how they could set a hard line for how much partisan dominance would be 
too much. Nevertheless, he did express some possibility to the use of partisan symmetry as a 
tool for a partisan gerrymandering standard. He did not discount that it could be used for both 
planning and litigation of redistricting, but that it would need other factors as well. Something 
that accounted for the other reasons, besides partisanship, that asymmetry could occur, like 
geography and compliance with traditional redistricting criteria (Stephanopoulos and 
McGhee, 2015: 844-845). 
 
The majority in the LULAC v. Perry decision did once again hold that partisan 
gerrymandering is a matter that is theoretically within the domain of the Supreme Court. But 
one has to ask if their unwillingness to look at partisan gerrymandering leads to more focus on 
race within districting. It seems unlikely that the reason Latino voters were divided between 
District 23 and 25 was because of an intention to hurt them because of their ethnicity, but 




4.12 Benisek v. Lamone 2018 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Maryland’s 6th District. Source: (Cooper, 2017) 
 
The Supreme Court will also hear another gerrymandering case in 2018. In what was an 
unexpected turn of events, the Court announced on December 8, 2017 that it would take a 
case from Maryland, called Benisek v. Lamone. It has received less attention than Gill v. 
Whitford, but some predict it could prove to be the more important of the two (Greenhouse, 
2018). This case is brought by seven Republicans, who formerly voted in Maryland’s Sixth 
District. The Sixth District elected a Republican to Congress in every election from 1992 to 
2010, until the Democratic controlled legislature conducted a large population transfer in the 
redistricting process that followed the 2010 census. Following the population transfer, that 
saw a swing of more than 90 000 voters, the 20-year Republican incumbent Roscoe Bartlett 
lost the congressional election of 2012 to the Democratic candidate John Delaney 
(Greenhouse, 2018). The announcement that the Supreme Court would hear a second partisan 
gerrymandering case led to much speculation about what it meant for the challengers in the 
case of Gill v. Whitford.  
 
The Republican voters challenging the 2011 redistricting as an unconstitutional gerrymander 
do not bring the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or any form of 
statistical based test into the case, they base their claim purely on a violation of the First 
Amendment. They claim that unlike the equal-protection approach to partisan 
gerrymandering, the First Amendment retaliation framework does not depend on a unifying 
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definition of “fairness” or require courts to determine when a map has gone “too far”. Instead, 
it challenges whether the State has imposed a real or practical burden in retaliation for past 
political support of the other party. Rather than looking at statistical measures of imbalance, it 
addresses the practical effects of a gerrymander (Epps, 2018).  
 
One reason for why the Supreme Court chose to hear the case from Maryland might be the 
bipartisan symmetry of having one case brought forward by Republicans and another by 
Democrats. Chief Justice Roberts had worried, during the argument in Gill v. Whitford, that 
the Supreme Courts status and integrity could take a big hit if people perceived the court as 
intervening on gerrymandering in order to favor one party over another. Hearing the 
Maryland case as well could hinder that perception (Greenhouse, 2018).  
 
Judge Paul V. Niemeyer, who was part of the three-judge panel of the United States District 
Court that handled the case in Maryland, wrote a devastating observation of gerrymandering’s 
place in American politics: “The widespread nature of gerrymandering in modern politics is 
matched by the almost universal absence of those who will defend its negative effect on our 
democracy. Indeed, both Democrats and Republicans have decried it when wielded by their 
opponents but nonetheless continue to gerrymander in their own self-interest when given the 
opportunity” (Liptak, 2018) 
 
Another reason why the Supreme Court chose to process Benisek v. Lamone could be because 
the two cases are framed differently. In Wisconsin, the Democrats challenged the whole 
redistricting and claimed that it violated their 14th Amendment right to equal protection. 
Previous Supreme Court precedence has been unfavorable to statewide challenges. The 
Maryland case challenges only the Sixth congressional district, and was litigated as a question 
of the Republican voter’s rights to free speech and association under the First Amendment. 
The theory is that the Democrats dismantled the old district in retaliation for the support its 
voters gave the sitting Republican representative. (Greenhouse, 2018)  
 
To focus on the First Amendment could give the case an increased chance of passing. As 
justice Kennedy, cited in Greenhouse (2018), wrote in his Vieth v. Jubelirer opinion the last 
time the Supreme Court had a gerrymandering case: ”Where it is alleged that a gerrymander 
had the purpose and effect of imposing burdens on a disfavored party and its voters, the First 
Amendment may offer a sounder and more prudential basis for intervention than does the 
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Equal Protection Clause”. This is important, as Kennedy is likely to be the deciding judge. 
The appellants in Benisek v. Lamone could also have another advantage over those in Gill v. 
Whitford, as a ruling in their favor would not change the map of an entire state, but have the 
less sweeping consequence of just changing one district. Perhaps even more important, their 
test based on practical burdens would remove the efficiency gap and other statistical tools 
from the court cases and replace it with the justices’ gut feeling (Epps, 2018). A ruling that 
strikes down a voting district as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander could revolutionize 
American politics, but perhaps the biggest challenge would be to find a practical remedy 
against the extreme examples of gerrymandering without getting judges involved in dozens 
and dozens of important political decisions (Liptak, 2018).  
 
The Supreme Court heard the oral arguments in the case on March 28, 2018. There was a 
sense that the conversation was moving in circles, as some justices worried that the courts 
would get involved in every redistricting dispute, some thought that gerrymandering was a 
political decision they should not get involved in and even those would like to take on 
gerrymandering was unsure if they could find a manageable standard to apply. This was in 
many ways a repetition of what happened in the oral arguments of Gill v. Whitford. Justice 
Kennedy, who is likely to be the deciding justice in the gerrymandering cases, repeated his 
earlier thoughts that while a test seems elusive, extreme partisan gerrymandering could 
possibly be seen constitutionally as retaliation for a voter’s previous votes. If so, it would be a 
violation of the First Amendment, which is the claim that the plaintiffs have brought in this 
case (Barnes, 2018).   
 
Partisan gerrymandering has long been a forest that the Supreme Court has been reluctant to 
step into. With new technology and a growth in party-line voting, those who wish do redraw 
party lines to fit their political objectives have an enhanced capacity to do so. These tools are 
also available to those who are against gerrymandering, and there has been an influx of 
metrics from social scientists that tries to find a good standard to measure it by. The Supreme 
Court’s almost exclusive focus on equal population and racial gerrymandering has liberated as 
much as constrained the self-interested behavior of politicians and parties, yet a judicial 
plunge into the political thicket of partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering could also be 
problematic and is something the justices fear would result in a wave of redistricting cases all 
over the country (Mann, 2005: 93). The Supreme Court’s decision to hear the merits of both 
Benisek v. Lamone and Gill v. Whitford in the 2017-2018 term could be an indication that it is 
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ready to make a final ruling on partisan gerrymandering. Together the two cases make 
redistricting and gerrymandering very current themes. How the cases are framed in terms of 
representation and their claims of First and Fourteenth Amendment violations makes them a 
good fit for the questions I want to explore in this thesis. The next chapter will go in detail on 
the events that led to the Supreme Court case, take a look at the oral arguments that was 





5. Gill v. Whitford 
 
5.1 Introduction to the case 
The Supreme Court case that can settle the question of whether partisan gerrymandering is 
unconstitutional or not, is called Gill v. Whitford and arose following the 2011 redistricting 
plan in Wisconsin. After taking control of Wisconsin’s state legislature and governorship in 
the 2010 election, the Republicans started the process of drawing a map that would cement 
their majority in future elections. The new redistricting map was approved by the state 
legislature as Act 43 in 2011 (Wines, 2017).   
 
The Republican legislative leaders and their staff used redistricting software that provided 
them with data on population demographics and current political boundaries to help them 
draft district maps. They made sure to try to follow state and federal requirements on 
traditional redistricting criteria and drew several maps that secured different levels of partisan 
advantage. The drafters were also assisted by a political science professor that provided them 
with visuals of the maps under different electoral scenarios (Harvard Law Review, 2017). 
 
The Republicans seem to have been successful in drawing a district map that gives them a 
solid partisan advantage. In the three elections since Act 43 came into effect, Democrats have 
never won more than 39 of the 99 seats in the state assembly, even when they won a majority 
of the votes. The 2012 elections saw Republicans win 48.6 percent of the votes, but they were 
able to capture 60 out of the 99 seats in the Assembly. In 2014 they won 52 percent of the 
vote, which enabled them to win 63 seats (Liptak, 2017a). Following these elections, some 
Democratic voters alleged that the 2011 redistricting plan had purposefully and 






Figure 5.1: Map of Wisconsin’s State Assembly districts. Source: (Bazelon, 2017).  
 
They accused the Republican state legislature of employing gerrymandering tactics that 
“wasted” Democratic votes by both concentrating voters in a small number of districts to limit 
the number of seats they could influence and in other places by spreading them out across 
several districts so they could not achieve a majority. These tactics are called packing and 
cracking, and can be very effective when used together. The objective would be to make sure 
you have a majority, but not too big of a majority, of voters in as many districts as possible 
(Wofford, 2014).  
 
The case was filed with the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin 
on July 8th 2015. It was filed by the Campaign Legal Center on behalf of twelve plaintiffs that 
are registered Democrats, including lead plaintiff Professor William Whitford, who claimed 
that the 2011 state assembly map was an unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering that 
favored the Republicans and discriminated against Democratic voters (Wines, 2016).  
 
On November 21th 2016, a 2-1 decision declared that the map was unconstitutional. The 
three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin outlined a 
standard for evaluating claims of partisan gerrymandering, struck down the redistricting map 
from Wisconsin as unconstitutionally partisan and ordered the defendants to enact a new 
districting plan. Though many justices has viewed partisan gerrymandering as problematic 
and unconstitutional, the problem in previous cases has been that they lack a discernible and 
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manageable standard to apply when assessing the claims. This is what the District Court now 
believed that they had found by “narrowly defining the degree and duration of partisan 
advantage that would rise to the level of invidiousness and employing an innovative measure 
of voting power”. (Harvard Law Review, 2017) 
 
To get there, the District Court adopted the three-pronged standard that the plaintiffs had 
presented. The standard found that a districting plan violated the Constitution if it: 
1. Was created with a discriminatory intent. Was the motive to favor one party over the 
other? 
2. Has a large and durable discriminatory effect. Is one party’s vote being wasted to a 
larger degree than the other party’s? 
3. Cannot be justified on other, legitimate legislative grounds. Can other things than 
partisan gerrymandering explain the discriminatory effect? 
(Harvard Law Review, 2017). 
 
5.1.1 What were the arguments and/or evidence that there was intent? 
To start off, the justices had to consider whether there was discriminatory intent or not. There 
is a precedent for allowing some political considerations in redistricting and the political 
reality is that partisan considerations and incumbency will play some role, so it was necessary 
to find a dividing line between those legal partisan considerations and unjust partisan 
gerrymandering. The focus was on entrenchment, because that is something that can make the 
party in control, and by proxy the state government, impervious to the interests of citizens 
who voted for or are affiliated with other political parties. The justices found evidence of the 
Republican politicians intent on entrenching their power by looking at the maps they had 
generated and the analysis that they had done (Harvard Law Review, 2017).  
 
5.1.2 What is the evidence that shows the effect? 
When they assessed if the redistricted map had its intended effect, the justices looked at the 
election results from 2012 and 2014, as well as statistical analysis from expert witnesses that 
helped them conclude that the map had achieved the intended goal. To confirm their findings, 
they employed a new measure called the “efficiency gap”. 
 
The efficiency gap is a new way to measure partisan symmetry. The formula is quite simple:  
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Efficiency Gap = Seat Margin – [2x Vote Margin]. 
 
Where: 
“Seat Margin” is the share of seats held by the party, minus 50 percent, and  
“Vote Margin” is the share of votes the party receives, minus 50 percent.  
 
If the efficiency gap is positive, then the party has an electoral advantage, while it is at a 
disadvantage if the score is negative (Stephanopoulos and McGhee, 2015: 853).  
 
It measures in a single number the difference between the amount of votes each party receives 
that are “wasted”, divided by the total number of votes cast in the election. By wasted, the 
authors refer to votes that does not contribute to the election of a candidate. This means that 
both votes for a losing candidate and surplus votes for a winning candidate are counted as 
wasted. To categorize these votes as wasted is controversial, but they can be good indicators 
that cracking and packing strategies have been used to gerrymander districts (Stephanopoulos 
and McGhee, 2015: 835-836). 
 
The political scientists behind the efficiency gap, Nicholas Stephanopoulos and Eric McGhee, 
view it as a superior measure to partisan bias, the measurement the Supreme Court considered 
in LULAC v. Perry. This looks at the seat share that each party would win given the same 
share of the statewide vote. The problem that Stephanopoulos and McGhee sees with the 
partisan bias is that uses hypothetical election results rather than real election outcomes. It 
assumes that the share of swing voters would be equally distributed across the state, which is 
usually not the case considering the different residential patterns of the two parties’ voters. 
And a lot of times it can be useless to look at an equal vote share for the two parties, as some 
states will lean solidly towards one of the parties in most elections (Stephanopoulos and 
McGhee, 2015: 836-837). The efficiency gap on the other hand, can still be applicable in 
uncompetitive systems. Studies indicate that almost half of recent state legislature elections 
have been so uncompetitive that partisan bias cannot be calculated reliably for them. The 
efficiency gap can still be used, which is important since many cases of gerrymandering 




5.1.3 Limitations of the efficiency gap 
While the efficiency gap has some important advantages over partisan bias and other 
measures of gerrymandering, it still has some possible limitations. One of them is how it 
struggles when one party has a very dominant advantage. Take for instance a situation where 
one party receives 75 percent of the vote, then a plan with a gap of zero would give that party 
all of the seats. Any additional votes would be seen as wasted, since the party already holds 
all the seats, and suggest a growing gap in favor of the opposing party. While that might be 
technically true, it does not really comply with the idea of fairness, as the majority party can 
hardly be said to have a disadvantage in that situation. This is not much of a problem though, 
as such one-sided results are very rare. They can also easily be identified and flagged before 
an analysis (Stephanopoulos and McGhee, 2015: 863-864).  
 
Many have suggested that there needs to be standard that curbs partisan gerrymandering, but 
McGann et al. do not need think that we need to go looking for a new standard. We already 
know what partisan bias is and there has been developed, peer-reviewed and implemented 
methods of measuring it, such as the partisan symmetry standard. What is needed is a correct 
definition and a measure of partisan bias in legal terms. It is not enough to show that a district 
maps treat parties differently, a legal standard needs to show that this is a violation of the 
constitutional rights of the individual voters. They argue that the problem with the efficiency 
gap is that as a standard it is not clear how it is linked to any constitutionally protected right. 
The argument the standard highlights is one of general fairness. Also mentioned is that it is 
not a given that each party having an equal number of wasted votes would be uniquely fair. It 
could just as well be argued that the parties should waste the same number of votes for each 
seat they receive, or that parties should waste the same share of their vote, so if they get twice 
the number of votes then they should waste twice as many as well. These different standards 
would all give very different results and an argument based on the efficiency gap standard as 
presented by Stephanopoulos and McGhee could be countered by saying that there are many 
equally plausible standards (McGann, Smith, Latner and Keena, 2015: 295-296). 
 
A potentially more important flaw of the efficiency gap is the instability of the gap from one 
election to the nest. Research has shown that the gap in one election is a relatively weak 
predictor of the next election’s gap, when put in a model that includes a variety of other 
variables. This means that many partisan gerrymanders can be overcome in swing elections. 
However, the instability is also a key feature of elections themselves, as each party’s vote 
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share can vary a lot within the time span of a plan. That does not mean that all partisan 
gerrymanders can be overcome. Some are drawn with such large and durable efficiency gaps 
that they will keep benefitting one party over multiple elections. This is where the strongest 
case can be made for the need for judicial intervention, as it shows the lasting effect of a 
gerrymandered redistricting plan (Stephanopoulos and McGhee, 2015: 864-865).  
 
A problem for any measure of gerrymandering is uncontested seats. Without a choice for the 
voters, it is impossible to know their preferences, which again makes it impossible to 
determine the degree of gerrymandering in a district. The only thing you can say with almost 
certainty is that the share of the vote for the winner would have been lower. Scientists usually 
try to assign a vote share to reflect how voters might have cast their ballot if they had the 
chance to, rather than go with the uncontested result. In their analysis using the efficiency 
gap, Stephanopoulos and McGhee used presidential voting data on district level for 
congressional races, while for the state legislature districts they had to use voter information 
from other districts in the same state and election year together with information from the 
same district in other elections (Stephanopoulos and McGhee, 2015: 865-867).  
 
5.1.4 How to implement the efficiency gap in a standard? 
The Supreme Court has been looking for a manageable standard for redistricting for a long 
time. One of the big questions for the Supreme Court in the case of Vieth v. Jubelirer was 
how to distinguish between some and too much partisan unfairness. They need a threshold for 
which districts are considered unconstitutional or too gerrymandered.  It is hard to tell these 
apart if you just use qualitative standards. But if you take a quantitative approach, you can set 
a calculable standard where every case that exceeds the standard must show a legitimate 
justification that makes the inequality necessary. Any efficiency gaps below the standards 
threshold would be assumed valid. This would be similar to how cases involving unequal 
district populations are solved (Stephanopoulos and McGhee, 2015: 885-886).  
 
So what should the threshold be for a quantitative gerrymandering standard? While opponents 
of gerrymandering would like the efficiency gap as close to zero as possible, that is not a 
practical or desired threshold. One reason for this is the expressed statement in earlier cases 
like Vieth v. Jubelirer that some partisanship is tolerable. But an important methodological 
reason is that a plan’s efficiency gap will vary between elections, so even if the gap is zero in 
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one election, it is unlikely to stay at exactly the same level in the next election. Unless the 
vote share stays exactly the same, there will be a shift in the gap and the bar needs to be high 
enough to allow for that. The threshold suggested by Stephanopoulos and McGhee is at two 
seats for congressional plans and eight percent for state legislature plans. Their reasoning for 
using different measurements is that each state’s congressional representatives combine to 
form the House of Representatives and a big gap in large state is not equivalent to the same 
gap in a smaller state. It is the opposite for state legislatures, as each of them is a self-
contained entity, where a state like New Hampshire has ten times the number of state 
legislators that Alaska has, even though the population of the former is less than double that 
of the latter. When they examined the plans from the last five redistricting cycles, which 
covers the entire period since the reapportionment revolution in the 1960’s, they found that 
the thresholds were breached in 14 percent of congressional plans and 12 percent of state 
legislature plans. This indicates that it is not normal to have a plan that averages such a large 
gap and that those district plans that do are a result of an unusually extensive gerrymandering 
process (Stephanopoulos and McGhee, 2015: 887-888). 
 
Gill v. Whitford shows how effective modern partisan gerrymandering has become 
increasingly more effective, by using political and behavioral data and computers. Measured 
by the efficiency gap, four of the five most gerrymandered state legislature maps in the last 45 
years were drawn after 2010, according to Stephanopoulos, while eight of the ten most 
partisan maps for congressional districts were also created after 2010. This included 
Wisconsin’s congressional map (Wines, 2017). The efficiency gap also rated Wisconsin’s 
state assembly map the fifth most partisan among over 700 state redistricting plans from 1972 
to 2014 (Wines, 2017). 
 
5.1.5 Can it be justified? 
Back in the District Court in Wisconsin, the judges had found the two first prongs of the 
standard to be fulfilled, as the evidence suggested that the redistricting plan was created with 
a discriminatory effect and had a large and durable effect. Then it had to consider the third 
prong of the standard, was there any legitimate justifications for the entrenchment that Act 43 
had caused. The reason that certainly needed to be considered was the tendency for 
Democrats to live more concentrated in urban areas, which creates a natural advantage for 
Republicans. Nevertheless, it was not enough to justify the magnitude of entrenchment that 
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Act 43 produced. The creators of the map had tested and passed on several maps with less 
partisan effect that was equally or more successful in achieving the lawful objectives of a 
redistricting (Harvard Law Review, 2017). 
 
Their conclusion was not unanimous though, as judge Griesbach dissented. He had a problem 
with the majority’s inclusion of intent in the partisan gerrymandering test and wrote that the 
Constitution should address political intent by delegating the responsibility of redistricting to 
another body, an action outside of the court’s authority. He also preferred a standard based on 
deviation from traditional redistricting criteria, rather than entrenchment, as he thought that 
have a greater chance of success in the Supreme Court. Judge Griesbach disagreed 
theoretically with how the efficiency gap seemed to view proportional representation as a 
right, as well as how votes for the losing side are characterized as wasted. Finally, he took 
issue with the use of the efficiency gap, being skeptic to elevating a theory from a non-peer-
reviewed article and making it the measurement of constitutional elections jurisprudence. He 
highlighted the volatile nature of the measurement and that controlling for political geography 
can significantly reduce it (Harvard Law Review, 2017).  
 
The majority in the District Court decision on Gill v. Whitford addressed the questions of 
justiciability that was raised in Vieth v. Jubelirer, the previous Supreme Court that dealt with 
partisan gerrymandering. The plurality in Vieth v. Jubelirer acknowledged that some level of 
partisan consideration has to be considered unconstitutional, but left the challenge of 
establishing when that line was crossed to the lower courts.  
 
One of the biggest challenges in developing a standard is to determine where you should draw 
the line, as you do not want it to be indeterminate, but at the same time it can be difficult to 
find the perfect number. Instead of establishing an exact numerical threshold for when the 
gerrymandering became unconstitutional, the majority in the District Court drew the line at 
the point where the partisan advantage will persist even with reasonable swings in the vote 
share each party receives.   
 
5.2 Supreme Court appeal 
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5.2.1 Oral arguments 
Following the District Court’s ruling in the case, the State of Wisconsin wished to appeal to 
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was required to take the case, due to special 
procedures required by 28 United States Code §§1253 and 2284[a] when a case involves 
reapportionment, though it was the Court’s decision whether they wanted to hear the case in 
full or just rule to affirm or reverse the decision (Gerken, 2016). In July 2017, the Supreme 
Court agreed to hear the State’s challenge to the decision and granted the request to put the 
remapping action on hold until a Supreme Court decision was made. This is the first time that 
the Supreme Court will make a decision on partisan gerrymandering based on the freedom of 
association clause in the First Amendment in addition to the Equal Protection Clause.  
 
Oral arguments were given by Paul Smith from the Campaign Legal Center, who represented 
the original plaintiffs. The arguments in defense of Act 43 were given by Misha Tseytlin, the 
Wisconsin Solicitor General, and by Erin E. Murphy, who participated as an amicus on behalf 
of Wisconsin’s State Senate. They were heard on October 3rd 2017. While the Supreme Court 
seemed to agree on the distastefulness of gerrymandering, they appeared pretty divided after 
the oral session about whether the Court could find a standard for determining when the 
practice was unconstitutional. The four most liberal justices see it as a huge democratic issue 
and want the Supreme Court to step in. The four most conservative of the justices indicated 
that they felt the Court should not intervene. Chief Justice Roberts expressed his worry that it 
could hurt the legitimacy of the Supreme Court to strike down voting districts in favor of one 
political party: “That is going to cause some very serious harm to the status and integrity of 
the decisions of this court in the eyes of the country” (Liptak and Shear, 2017). 
 
A lot of the argument was centered on various statistical tests for identifying extreme cases of 
partisan gerrymandering and what role social science should have in redistricting. Mr. 
Tseytlin argued that the plaintiffs were relying on hypothetical and flimsy social science 
evidence, that they were willing launch a new redistricting revolution based upon. Using 
partisan symmetry as districting criteria would not be a neutral method of drawing districts, in 
his opinion (Gill v. Whitford Oral Arguments, 2017: 26-28). Chief Justice Roberts seemed 
skeptical as well when he referred to it as “sociological gobbledygook” (Gill v. Whitford Oral 
Arguments, 2017: 40), but Justice Kagan did not agree and said, “What I’m suggesting is that 
this is not kind of hypothetical, airy-fairy, we guess, and then we guess again. I mean, this is 
pretty scientific by this point” (Gill v. Whitford Oral Arguments, 2017: 15).  
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Justice Alito wondered how, with judges, scholars, legal experts and political scientists 
looking for a manageable standard since Bandemer v. Davis 30 years ago and even before 
then, they were now sure that they had the right standard and that this was the right time. Mr. 
Smith answered that the Supreme Court had laid down a challenge in Vieth v. Jubelirer and 
given two things that was needed to find a workable standard. They had asked for a 
substantive definition of fairness and a way to measure it so that judicial intervention can be 
limited to the very serious cases. Now the social scientists had three different ways to measure 
asymmetry: the median-mean measure, the partisan bias measure and the efficiency gap. In 
the case of Wisconsin’s Act 43, Smith said, “they all come to the exact same conclusion that 
this is one of the most extreme gerrymanders ever drawn in – in living memory of the United 
States, one of the five worst out of the 230 maps that Professor Jackman studied” (Gill v. 
Whitford Oral Arguments, 2017: 42-46). In his rebuttal argument, Mr. Tseytlin argued that 
nothing new had been presented to the Supreme Court. That the partisan asymmetry concept 
that professor King had presented in his amicus brief from the LULAC v. Perry case, had just 
been recycled and used again in this case (Gill v. Whitford Oral Arguments, 2017: 64). 
 
When the question of a manageable standard was debated, Justice Breyer presented his own 
suggestion to how gerrymandering cases could be considered. This standard had a lot in 
common with the one suggested in the District Court. Step one would be to consider if one 
party was in full control of the redistricting process. There would not be a reason to look at 
the case if the redistricting was done by, for instance, a bipartisan commission. Step two 
would be to examine if the map treat political parties different, by looking at partisan 
asymmetry through tools like the efficiency gap. Step three is to consider if the asymmetry 
would persist over a range of votes. Next would be to see if it is an extreme outlier. You look 
at thousands of maps and evaluate how bad it is compared to others. And then, if it fails all 
the other steps, you consider if there is any other justification for it than partisan electoral 
gains. Breyer suspected that this could be manageable, but he was not absolutely certain. But, 
as he said: “I throw it out there as my effort to take the technicalities and turn them into 
possibly manageable questions” (Gill v. Whitford Oral Arguments, 2017: 11-13). 
 
Justice Kennedy, who is expected to be the deciding vote in the Supreme Court’s decision, 
asked no questions of the lawyer representing the Democratic voters who are challenging the 
district map. However, he had several skeptical questions that he asked the lawyers defending 
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Wisconsin’s Act 43. Kennedy pressed hard on whether it would be lawful for a state to make 
a law or constitutional amendment that said all legitimate factors must be used in a way that 
favors party X or party Y. After some equivocal answers, Ms. Murphy said that it would 
probably be unconstitutional if it was on the face of it and “I think that that would be better 
thought of probably as an equal protection violation, but you could think of it just as well, I 
think, as a First Amendment violation in the sense that it is viewpoint discrimination against 
the individuals who the legislation is saying that you have to specifically draw the maps in a 
way to injure” (Gill v. Whitford Oral Arguments, 2017: 26-28).  
 
Overall, Kennedy asked five questions and made five statements during the state of 
Wisconsin’s arguments. He did not speak during the time that the Wisconsin Democrats 
presented their arguments. Some took this as a signal that he is leaning towards the side that 
claims partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional. Justices do not just ask questions to get 
answers from the lawyers that argue the case. It can be a signal to their fellow judges of their 
position and potentially an attempt to lure them over to his or her side. Empirical research 
confirms that questions from the justices can be bad news for the receiving party. Data 
gathered from the transcripts of all the oral arguments in cases Justice Kennedy has 
participated in from 1988 to 2014 indicates that it is bad news to receive questions from him. 
When he votes for the respondent, which in this case would be the Wisconsin Democrats, he 
directs 93.3 words to them. When he votes against the respondent, with the state of Wisconsin 
in this case, he directs 102.0 words to them. And when he directs zero words to a respondent, 
Kennedy ended up voting for the party in 272 cases, while he would vote against in 177 of the 
cases (Roeder and Druke, 2017). While the numbers paint a positive image for the 
respondents, they also indicate that it is far from a certainty that their case will get Justice 
Kennedy’s vote. A decision in the case is expected by June 2018.   
 
5.3 Amicus Briefs 
I will now go through all the amicus briefs filed in this case and find the main arguments each 
author presents and group them in categories. The briefs give an overview over the arguments 
used on both sides of the gerrymandering question and how they argue over its legality. The 
amicus briefs are public documents used in the court system, which gives easy access and 
makes them verifiably authentic..  
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An amicus curia brief, which will be referred to as “amicus brief” in this text, is a document 
that is meant to bring a relevant matter to the attention of the Court. The amicus brief should 
concern a matter not already brought before the court and indicate which party it is written in 
support of. As cases that go through the legal system in the United States can affect more 
people than the directly involved parties, amicus briefs can provide judges with data and 
perspectives that can help them decide complex court cases (Cornell Law School, 2018).   
 
The Supreme Court will in many cases ask the Solicitor General to file an amicus brief, and 
the opinions expressed in them is often referred to by the Court. But public interest groups 
like the NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund and the American Civil Liberties Union 
are also frequently filing amicus briefs in cases related to their goals. As the Court receives a 
lot of briefs, it is important to stand out if you want to make an impact. Some judges view 
amicus briefs as a nuisance that increases the workload without much benefit. They feel that 
most files duplicate the arguments and positions that one of the parties has brought forward. 
To be noticed, one must bring something new and interesting to the table. This could be new 
research, technical and background information, an explanation of the connection between the 
case and other pending cases, or a demonstration of the impact the ruling in the case might 
have (Kearney and Merrill, 2000: 745-746). 
 
The increasing importance of amicus briefs might be the biggest change in Supreme Court 
practice in the last several decades. The first recorded appearance of a brief was in 1821 in the 
case of Green v. Biddle and in the first decades of the 20th century, amicus briefs were only 
filed in about 10% of the cases. Nowadays, that pattern is completely reversed and there are 
very few cases where the Supreme Court does not receive one or more amicus briefs 
(Kearney and Merrill, 2000: 744). 
 
As the number of submitted amicus briefs has increased, so have the amount of citations and 
quotations of briefs found in the opinions written by justices. But how much do they actually 
influence the outcome of Supreme Court cases? Research seem to indicate that having a small 
advantage in amicus brief support will slightly increase your chance of success, while a large 
discrepancy shows little sign of increasing it and might even be counterproductive. The 
Solicitor General is uniquely successful as an amicus filer, but other institutions like ACLU 
and the states also have a higher than average rate of success. These kinds of institutions file 
many briefs and know how to make them impactful. Amicus briefs do seem to matter “insofar  
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as they provide legally relevant information not supplied by the parties to the case – 
information that assists the Court in reaching the correct decision as defined by the complex 
norms of our legal culture” (Kearney and Merrill, 2000: 829-830). It is hard to say if any of 
the parties have an advantage based on that. The plaintiffs, referred to as the appellees in the 
amicus briefs, has a large advantage in the number of briefs filed in their support. Among that 
large number of briefs are several from well-known institutions with a lot of experience when 
it comes to writing briefs. The defendants, referred to as the appellants in the amicus briefs, 
have fewer of those organizations writing in their support, but they do have states writing on 
their behalf. The fact that both parties have experienced actors in this field writing in support 
of them might even out any large advantage, but it will come down to what elements they 
highlight and if they can provide clarity to questions that the justices might have. I will now 




# Author[s] of brief: In favor of: Arguments: 
1 Republican Nation Committee Appellants 
[Gill] 
The appellees have no standing to bring a statewide claim. The efficiency 
gap is in conflict with jurisprudence and the appellees approach would 
effectively require proportional representation. The District Court’s 
conception of political gerrymandering is too wide and would give federal 
government more authority in regulating local elections.' 
2 Judicial Watch, Inc and Allied 
Educational Foundation 
Appellants The efficiency gap is a poor tool for identifying partisan gerrymandering 
and the theory is based on unsettled science. 
3 Tennessee State Senators Appellants Gerrymandering has been a part of American politics since its founding. 
The courts have struggled to find a manageable standard, because no 
standard exist. The efficiency gap is just a disguise for proportional 
representation and the Court should hold that traditional redistricting 
standards are sufficient curbs to gerrymandering. 
4 Wisconsin Institute for Law and 
Liberty 
Appellants Partisan gerrymandering claims are not justiciable. Act 43 is lawful since it 
complies with traditional redistricting principles. 
5 Majority Leader and Temporary 
President of the New York State 
Senate and members of the 
Majority Coalition 
Appellants The efficiency gap is not a good measurement of partisanship in a political 
system with coalitions and minor parties. Redistricting will end up with 
endless micro managing by federal courts. 
6 States of Texas et al. Appellants Partisan purpose is inherent in the nature of legislative reapportionment. 
Appellees failed to offer a limited and precise standard. The efficiency gap-
standard is not judicially manageable and relies on group rights rather than 
individual rights, which leads to a proportional representation standard 
already rejected by the Court. 
7 Wisconsin State Senate and 
Wisconsin State Assembly 
Appellants Too broad cause of action for political gerrymandering would give the 
federal government more authority to regulate local elections, which would 
change balance of power between states and the federal government. 
Statewide partisan gerrymandering claims rest on a distorted view of 
electoral politics and representative democracy. The constitution does not 
guarantee proportional representation, the voters elect candidates and not 
statewide delegations, party identification can change and voters who 
support a losing candidate are not losing representation or access to the 
political process. The efficiency gap is biased in favor of Democrats. 
8 Southeastern Legal Foundation Appellants The appellees have no standing to bring a statewide claim.  
9 Legacy Foundation Appellants The appellees approach would effectively require proportional 
representation and take away state legislatures ability to redistrict. The 
efficiency gap's concept of "Wasted Voters" should be rejected by the 
Supreme Court. 
 60 
10 Republican State Leadership 
Committee 
Appellants No familiar and well-developed constitutional standard has been breached. 
A departure from familiar standards is not warranted, because the alleged 
harms of gerrymandering are not substantiated.  
11 National Republican 
Congressional Committee 
Appellants The efficiency gap is a flawed method and should not be part of a standard. 
It is biased in favor of Democrats. Voter preferences change over time. 
Wisconsin's Act 43 is lawful, since it complies with traditional redistricting 
principles. 
12 Wisconsin Manufacturers & 
Commerce 
Appellants Appellees theory disregard the roles of individual choice, therefore the case 
fails both conceptually and legally.  
13 American Civil Rights Union Appellants Too broad cause of action for political gerrymandering would give the 
federal government more authority to regulate local elections, which would 
change balance of power between states and the federal government.  
14 Plaintiffs in Benisek v. Lamone Neither party The Court should only look at the merits of the claims before them, and not 
make a decision on the justiciability of gerrymandering as a whole.  
15 Erik McGhee Neither party The efficiency gap is a simple and historically grounded metric of partisan 
advantage. It does not depend on hypotheticals and is not easily 
manipulated. It is responsive to concerns the Supreme Court has raised in 
previous cases. The objections to the efficiency gap are easily met. 
16 Bernard Grofman and Ronald 
Keith Gaddie 
Neither party Courts must provide a check on egregious partisan gerrymandering. A 
justiciable partisan gerrymandering claim needs proof of partisan 
asymmetry, lack of responsiveness and causation. The Supreme Court has 
never confronted evidence of those three elements. 
17 Heather K. Gerken, et al. Appellees 
[Whitford] 
It is a long-standing practice that the Supreme Court finds a workable 
principle/test, while allowing lower courts to refine it over time. Partisan 
symmetry is a workable standard with history and support from social 
science. Wisconsin's Act 43 would fail under any partisan symmetry test 
and is and extreme outlier. 
18 Eric S. Lander Appellees A judicially manageable standard for recognizing excessive partisan 
gerrymandering requires some quantitative foundation. Technology is a 
threat that will grow if courts refuse to entertain claims of partisan 
symmetry, but could also provide objective measures and tools to recognize 
when a redistricting plan is excessively partisan. Act 43 is an extreme 
outlier among redistricting plans. 
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19 American Jewish Committee, et 
al. 
Appellees Entrenchment through severe partisan gerrymandering violates fundamental 
American democratic principles of representativeness and accountability in 
government. Denying voters a fair opportunity to participate in genuinely 
contestable legislative elections violate the First amendment. The Court 
must set limits on severe partisan gerrymandering to safeguard our 
democracy. 
20 American Civil Liberties Union, 
et al. 
Appellees The state has an obligation to function as a neutral referee in the electoral 
process. A legislature that through partisan gerrymandering debases the 
citizenry's right to cast a meaningful ballot would violate that principle. 
Wisconsin failed to demonstrate that it's plan was necessary to the 
advancement of a legitimate state interest. 
21 NAACP Legal Defense & 
Educational Fund, Inc., et al 
Appellees Partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable and require proof of 
invidious discrimination against voters based on their political party 
affiliation. A properly structured claim for partisan gerrymandering is 
consistent with the Voting Rights Act, would help protect against the 
manipulation of minority votes and help avoid detrimental spillover to cases 
brought under doctrines involving race.  
22 44 Election Law, Scientific 
Evidence, and Empirical Legal 
Scholars 
Appellees The Supreme Court should affirm the panel's decision that the partisan 
effects of the applications of political classifications in the drafting of Act 
43 are not justifiable and had the likely effect of entrenching a Republican 
partisan advantage throughout the life of the plan. 
23 Colleagues of Professor Norman 
Dorsen 
Appellees Denying voters a fair opportunity to participate in genuinely contestable 
legislative elections violates the first amendment.  
24 Political Science Professors Appellees Voter behavior is predictable because of highly stable partisan identity, 
which makes the partisan bias very durable. Because of advances in data 
analytics, partisan gerrymanders will only become more extreme in the 
absence of judicial intervention. Social science provides objective measures 
and tools that courts could use to evaluate the partisan bias of maps. 
25 Professor D. Theodore Rave Appellees The Court should be skeptical of districts drawn by incumbents and subject 
them to searching review. Recognizing the justiciability of political 
gerrymandering claims and affirming here will not require courts to review 
all redistricting decision.  
26 Political Geography Scholars Appellees The effects of political geography can be measured and it does not explain 
the partisan asymmetry in Wisconsin's legislative map.  
27 Brennan Center for Justice at 
N.Y.U. School of Law 
Appellees Extreme partisan gerrymandering undermines legislatures' accountability to 
the people and creates legislatures that are not representative of the 
electorate. They violate the First Amendment rights to political expression 
and association that are vital to representative democracy. 
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28 Law Professors Appellees The absence of a judicially enforced constraint on partisan gerrymandering 
has not prevented federal courts from facing redistricting litigations, but has 
led to distortions of other constraints on redistricting. Recognizing a 
judicially enforceable claim against partisan gerrymandering will not 
unjustifiably constrain states' redistricting choices.  
29 Senators John McCain and 
Sheldon Whitehouse 
Appellees Partisan gerrymandering has become a tool for powerful interests to distort 
the democratic process and leads to unrepresentative districts that have a 
corrosive effect on our democracy.  
30 Historians Appellees The American vision of representative democracy has been based on a 
legislature that reflects the broader electorate and is responsive to its 
demands. It requires a close correspondence between the voting public and 
its legislative assemblies. Partisan gerrymandering has been denounced 
throughout American history as an unconstitutional abuse of power. In the 
extreme form it takes today, partisan gerrymandering poses a severe threat 
to American ideas of representation and associational rights.  
31 Republican Statewide Officials 
Senators Bill Brock, et al. 
Appellees Partisan gerrymanders violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The 
Supreme Court has a long tradition of deciding cases that remedy 
legislative malapportionment. 
32 States of Oregon, et al. Appellees Extreme partisan gerrymandering harms the States and their citizens, and 
technology has made it easier. A purpose-and-effect test is manageable and 
will adequately account for the States' legitimate interests. 
33 League of Conservative Voters, 
et al. 
Appellees Political science research shows that a reapportionment plan with a larger 
efficiency gap will result in adoption of more partisan and extreme politics. 
The experience from Wisconsin since 2011 demonstrates that the 
legislature has done just that, while disregarding bipartisan consensus on 
many key issues. 
34 Center for Media and Democracy Appellees Past party preferences reliably predict the future statewide behavior of 
Wisconsin's voters and guided Act 43's redistricting plan. Voters have 
representational interests and rights that extend far beyond constituent 
services. 
35 Georgia State Conference of the 
NAACP, et al. 
Appellees Partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable. Invidious intent to minimize 
the voting power of a political element is a judicially-manageable standard 
that allows for necessary flexibility and evolution of subsidiary standards. 
36 California Citizens Redistricting 
Commission, et al. 
Appellees Neutral decision-makers can implement non-partisan standards for drawing 
electoral districts. Upon finding that a redistricting plan violates voters' 
rights through partisan gerrymandering, neutral redistricting standards are a 
permissible remedy. 
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37 Represent. Us, et al. Appellees Both major parties engage in partisan gerrymandering, which hurts voters 
from both parties. Partisan gerrymandering is a form of corruption, an issue 
the framers of the constitution were concerned with preventing.  
38 Constitutional Law Professors Appellees Treating judicial manageability as a freestanding justification for deeming 
an issue a nonjusticiable political question would depart from our 
constitutional history and tradition, plus it would have harmful practical 
consequences.  
39 Current Members of Congress, et 
al. 
Appellees The constitution established a system of government in which the people 
choose their elected representatives, not the other way around. Subsequent 
amendments to the constitution protect the right of individuals to associate 
for political ends and guarantee that all American enjoy equal protection of 
the laws, regardless of political affiliation. Partisan gerrymandering that has 
the purpose and effect of subordinating adherents of a political party and 
severely limiting the effectiveness of their votes violates the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
40 Bipartisan Group of 65 Current 
and Former State Legislators 
Appellees Partisan gerrymandering is a powerful tool for shutting out the opposing 
party. It has caused breakdowns in the political process, through breeding 
polarization, discouraging cooperation among legislators and leads to 
legislators that do not represent their constituents.  
41 Common Cause Appellees Partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable and the First Amendment 
provides an ideal framework for partisan gerrymandering claims.  
42 League of Women Voters Appellees Appellants proposed safe harbor for legislatures that follow traditional 
redistricting principles is legally unsupported and would have dangerous 
consequences. Even "normal"-looking district plans can violate 
representative and participatory rights protected bu the First and Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
43 Fairvote and One Nation One 
Vote 
Appellees Singling out voters on the basis of partisan affiliation is unconstitutional. 
States will retain ample flexibility in a districting process that excludes 
partisan gerrymandering, which could include other voting methods and 
multi-winner districts. 
44 Election Law and Constitutional 
Law Scholars 
Appellees The right of association protects an individual’s ability to enhance her 
political influence by association with other and forbids districting that 
discriminatorily burdens political association based on party affiliation. 
Wisconsin's Act 43 violates plaintiff's associational rights. 
45 International Municipal Lawyers 
Association, et al. 
Appellees Intentional partisan gerrymandering makes state legislatures un-










5.3.1 The Amicus Briefs in Gill v. Whitford 
When analyzing the amicus briefs in Gill v. Whitford, it quickly becomes clear that one party 
has received a lot more briefs in support of it. The number of amicus briefs in support of the 
appellants [Gill] is 13, while the briefs in support of the appellees [Whitford] count as many 
as 32. Three amicus briefs were filed in support of neither party. One of the three was filed by 
plaintiffs in another gerrymandering case, called Benisek v.  Lamone, and they argued that 
whatever the decision the Supreme Court made in this case, it should not make a decision on 
the justiciability of gerrymandering as a whole. Rather, they should only look at the 
justiciability or merits of the claims before them. The two other neutral amicus briefs were 
from social scientists, which were writing about analytical tools. Grofman and Gaddie writes 
in their brief about what a justiciable partisan gerrymandering claim needs to prove and 
46 Bipartisan Group of Current and 
Former Members of Congress 
Appellees Extreme partisan gerrymandering subverts traditional districting criteria, 
which harms both members and constituents, while it devalues pragmatic 
problem-solving and constituent-first representation in the House. It is also 
inconsistent with the nature of representation in our form of government 
and in conflict with the framer's vision. 
47 David Boyle Appellees The US constitutional amendments on election offer the court more power 
to find partisan gerrymandering justiciable and reformable. One the one 
hand, some amendments may seem to favor allowing legislatures wide 
control over election districting, even gerrymandering, but a greater number 
of amendments may favor allowing individual voters dignity and immunity 
from gerrymandering. 
48 Robin Best, et al. Appellees Advances in computer science and its application to political science has 
created analytical tools that were not previously available. The tools 
detected gerrymandering with "full analytical satisfaction". It is up to the 
Court to decide whether this kind of gerrymandering is good politics or bad 
politics.  
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argues that the necessary factors were not considered in previous gerrymandering cases. They 
also write about how the analytical tools have improved a lot since earlier cases like Davis v. 
Bandemer and Vieth v. Jubelirer. Eric McGhee, one of the developers of the efficiency gap, 
writes about how the efficiency gap works, what it analyzes and argues against some of the 
objections people have raised against the measuring tool.  
 
The briefs filed by politicians follow partisan lines for the most part. The Republican National 
Committee, the Republican State Leadership Committee and several Republican-controlled 
states have filed amici curiae in favor of the appellants, while several Democratic-controlled 
states have written in support of the appellees. The appellees are the Democratic voters who 
were the original plaintiffs in the case, while the appellants refer to the State of Wisconsin 
who appealed the District Court decision. It is interesting to note that the Democratic Nation 
Committee has not filed a brief in this case. However, there is also some Republican support 
for the appellees. Most of them no longer hold office, like former California Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger and former presidential candidate and Senator Bob Dole, but there is one 
current member of congress in Arizona Senator John McCain.  
 
A large number of amicus briefs making the case for the appellees are made up of 
professionals within relevant research fields such as historians, law professors, political 
geography scholars and political scientists. There is also a sizable group of civic and civil 
rights organizations, like the League of Women Voters, the American Civil Liberties Union 
and the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund. Though the number is fewer, there are 
some of those organizations filing in favor of the appellants as well. This includes the 
Southeastern Legal Foundation, Judicial Watch Inc. and the American Civil Rights Union.  
 
As I read the amicus briefs, I categorized the arguments that the authors of the briefs used in 
favor of the party they supported. Many of the authors highlight similar factors as reason for 
or against the ruling from the District Court. I have gathered the most compelling arguments 
in seven categories that I feel are the most important questions that the Supreme Court will 
have to consider when they make their ruling in Gill v. Whitford. One of them regards the 
question of standing and whether a voter can bring a case that does not just affect his or her 
district, but the whole state. This question will depend a lot on how the Court views 
representation. The difference between a dyadic and a collective view is clear in how the two 
sides of this case argue for their wanted outcome in the ruling of standard. The second 
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category is about judicial interference in the reapportionment process and whether too much 
interference will change the power balance between the states and the federal government. 
Partisan gerrymandering has been a political thicket that the Supreme Court has been 
reluctant to step into. A major reason for that is the fear that it will lead to a boatload of new 
cases and make map drawing a time consuming part the courts’ responsibilities. Another of 
the categories is the discussion around the need for a limited and precise standard for partisan 
gerrymandering and whether the efficiency gap should be a part of that standard. Related to 
that is a category on traditional redistricting standards, where it is argued that there is no need 
for a new standard and that district maps that follow the traditional criteria should be 
considered acceptable. These categories could be where the case gets decided, as it will be 
impossible to regulate gerrymandering without a satisfying standard. If it is deemed to be 
unconstitutional, there must be a way to decide when a redistricting becomes a gerrymander. 
Then there is a category on the topic of voter behavior and how predictable it is. Can partisan 
identity be used to predict voter decision-making or does that fail the concept of a voter’s 
individual choice? This is important for the question of constitutionality, since the assumption 
of voter behavior is central to a claim that Democratic voters have been discriminated against. 
It is also central to any defense of Act 43 that claims political geography is the reason for the 
partisan advantage of the district plan. Another category is about how partisan 
gerrymandering can lead to unrepresentative governments and a loss of legitimacy for the 
representatives. This is of course very central to the question of representation, which is 
central to the thesis. The last category discusses the question of justiciability, where briefs 
filed in favor of both parties argue that this case gives the Supreme Court a good opportunity 
to clarify the question, but have arguments for different outcomes. Does partisan 
gerrymandering violate the First and/or the Fourteenth Amendment? This category is 
important, as it is so related to the research question of the thesis. Act 43 can only be found to 
be unconstitutional if the Supreme Court finds partisan gerrymandering cases to be justiciable 
under the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
 
5.3.2 Standing to bring a statewide claim 
The first question the Supreme Court will have to consider is whether Whitford and the other 
plaintiffs in the case has the standing to bring a statewide claim. The amicus briefs from the 
Republican National Committee and Southeastern Legal Foundation argues that the District 
Court did a mistake when it held that the appellees had a standing to challenge Wisconsin’s 
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statewide legislative map. The Supreme Court has previously rejected attempts to challenge 
alleged gerrymandering of districts that they do not reside in. Showing examples from racial 
gerrymandering, the Republican National Committee’s brief points to how a voter in a racially 
gerrymandered district can be denied equal treatment, but that the voter cannot suffer harm or 
be discriminated against based on the composition of districts where he does not live 
(Republican National Committee, 2017: 9). 
 
The District Court held that the basis for racial gerrymandering claims is different from that 
of a political gerrymandering claim. The concern in a political gerrymandering case is the 
effect a statewide districting map can have on a party’s ability to convert votes into seats. This 
led the court to say that the harm in Gill v. Whitford is the result of the statewide redistricting 
map, not just how a particular district is designed. From that, it followed that that an 
individual Democrat had the standing to challenge the statewide map. The Southeastern Legal 
Foundation wrote in their brief about how only a few of the plaintiffs actually live in a district 
that is affected by the redistricting, but they purport to represent all Democrats in Wisconsin. 
Most of the plaintiffs do not even live in one of the districts they claim to have lost in the 
gerrymandered redistricting. This is interpreted as just an attempt to get more Democrats 
elected statewide. The Southeastern Legal Foundation’s brief adds that what they seek is a 
generalized benefit, which should mean that the appellees do not have the standing to make a 
claim (Southeastern Legal Foundation, 2017: 8-12).  
 
The appellees argue that racial gerrymandering cases are something separate, as this case is 
one where the alleged harm is vote dilution and viewpoint discrimination. The standard set in 
those cases are not contrary either, as the asserted claims in the racial gerrymandering cases 
haw been specific to one or more specific electoral districts. In their brief to the Supreme 
Court the appellees write that the claim asserted the case, an intentional and durable dilution 
of Democratic votes throughout Wisconsin, is unquestionably statewide. All partisan 
gerrymandering challenges brought to the Supreme Court has been statewide challenges and 
the Court has never said that it lacked jurisdiction due to a plaintiffs’ lack of standing. As 
such, the appellees are certain that they have the standing to pursue it if the partisan 




5.3.3 A transfer of authority to the federal government 
Several of the amicus briefs filed in favor of the appellants discuss the power balance between 
the states and the federal government. Redistricting of state legislatures is primarily the duty 
and obligation of states, but some of the amicus brief writers worry that a verdict in favor of 
the appellees would take power away from local government and lead to micro management 
by the federal courts. While the responsibility of redistricting is with the states, they are 
subject to certain constitutional standards, like the protection of racial minorities against 
discrimination and population equality between districts.  
 
The District Court’s invalidation of Act 43, the American Civil Rights Union and the Public 
Interest Legal Foundation claim, was not based on a well-established constitutional principle. 
Federal review and veto of state enactments should only happen under extraordinary 
circumstances or problems, which they exemplify with racial discrimination in voting. 
Considering that partisanship in redistricting has been seen as a lawful and common practice 
by the plurality in previous Supreme Court cases like Vieth v. Jubelirer, they argue that 
partisan gerrymandering cannot be seen as such an extraordinary problem. If it were to be 
seen as such, it would be a departure from the federalism principles recent cases have 
reaffirmed (American Civil Rights Union and Public Interest Legal Foundation, 2017: 5-8). 
 
A standard like the one proposed by the District Court could potentially lead to “epic amounts 
of litigation in federal courts over state legislative lines”, according to the Majority Leader 
and Temporary President of the New York State Senate and members of the Majority 
Coalition (2017: 20). They fear that it would be the case even if the plans meet all other 
traditional redistricting principles like respecting communities of interests, population 
equality and compactness. Instead of a redistricting process that ends with an act from the 
state legislature, the losers of the process will take the case to the federal courts and by the 
time a redistricting plan has finally been sanctioned, it will soon be time for a new census 
with a subsequent redistricting. In their eyes, this would be damaging to representative 
democracy in the states. The Majority Leader and his fellow members feel that both state 
legislatures and state voters are entitled to a degree of certainty and freedom from intervention 
from the federal court, which they fear that a judgment that upholds the District Court’s ruling 
would lead to (Majority Leader, Temporary President of the New York State Senate and 
Members of the Majority Coalition, 2017: 19-23).  
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If the Supreme Court decides to recognize a cause of action for partisan gerrymandering, then 
the Republican National Committee writes that it should be cautious when it defines the scope 
of it. As Congress has the authority to enforce any such right under §5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, a too broad cause of action for partisan gerrymandering could really change the 
balance of power between states and the federal government. They fear that it could lead to 
congressional efforts to oversee, dictate or even manipulate the partisan outcomes of election. 
In the most extreme cases, a state violation of the right to vote can lead to the state loosing its 
representation in the House of Representatives and with that the Electoral College, which is 
why the Republican National Committee argues that any standard the Supreme Court may 
decide to adopt, needs to have a high threshold for what constitutes a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (Republican National Committee, 2017: 33-38).  
 
5.3.4 About the efficiency gap and the need for a limited and precise standard 
The aspect of the Supreme Court case that received the most attention in the amicus briefs 
was probably the efficiency gap, the suggested standard for deciding if a gerrymander is 
unlawful. Both sides argued whether the standard offered is limited and precise, whether it is 
flawed or biased in favor of certain groups, and if there is a need for this kind of standard.  
 
The National Republican Congressional Committee argues in their brief that the efficiency 
gap is a flawed standard with several limitations. The math in how the efficiency gap is 
calculated can lead to results where packed districts cancel each other out, while a party that 
wins several close victories in competitive districts will result in a large gap. They claim that 
that the efficiency gap is just a more sophisticated way of saying that a party won a large 
number of close elections. The fact that there is a gap is not telling us anything about 
gerrymandering (National Republican Congressional Committee, 2017: 4-6).  
 
A central argument for opponents of the efficiency gap has been the claim that it does not 
account for the natural packing effect of political geography. Political groups that tend to 
cluster, like Democratic voters in cities, are systemically affected by natural packing, while 
Republicans live more spread out in exurbs and rural areas. Looking at the United States, as a 
whole there is a tendency that traditional districting criteria combined with Democratic voters 
clustering in cities results in additional Republican seats. This effect is even stronger in the 
state of Wisconsin. The National Republican Congressional Committee (2017: 6-8) 
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exemplifies this by showing how Donald Trump received over 80% or more of the votes in 43 
wards, while Hillary Clinton received over 80% in 260 wards in a state that Trump won by a 
margin of 0.7%. This shows how the Democrats rack up a large number of votes in districts 
that they win, while the Republicans typically have a smaller margin of victory but can win in 
a larger number of districts.  
 
It is also argued that the efficiency gap breaks with the First Amendment jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court. The model of voting behavior and the concept of wasted votes assumes that 
most voters would continue to vote for candidates from a particular party in election after 
election, regardless of the candidates running in the election, what district they are in, the 
parties’ platform for the election, as well as major issues and circumstances surrounding the 
election. The Republican National Committee claims that this view is contrary to what 
previous cases debating the First Amendment in the Supreme Court has ruled. They point to 
political communication cases, where the Court repeatedly gave robust protection to political 
speech and debate based on the premise that it plays a critical role in forming the outcome of 
elections. The same goes for cases about a party’s right to elect a candidate who best 
represent its political platform. The reason the Court is so protective of political parties’ 
associational rights, they argue, is that the Court recognize the importance of a party’s 
candidate and platform when it comes to electoral outcomes. Finally, the Republican National 
Committee points to how the Supreme Court has imposed strict scrutiny on measures that 
burden minor party rights. The case law on this issue is inconsistent with the efficiency gap’s 
concept of wasted votes (Republican National Committee, 2017: 28-33). 
 
Another claim against the efficiency gap is that it systematically favors the Democratic Party. 
Because the political landscape of Wisconsin, and many other states, consist of Democratic 
voters relatively concentrated in urban areas and Republican voters more dispersed, any 
attempt by a Republican-controlled legislature to take advantage of that political landscape 
would look suspicious under that theory. The Wisconsin State Senate & Wisconsin State 
Assembly writes that any standard must equally constrain Democratic-controlled and 
Republican-controlled legislators, if the Court wants to be perceived as a neutral arbiter. They 
claim that is no coincidence that the proposed theory would allow statewide, rather than 
district-specific partisan gerrymandering claims. The two outcomes that results in the largest 
efficiency gaps are precisely the ones the political geography makes it more likely that will 
happen, namely landslide victories in Democratic-leaning districts while Republican leaning 
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districts end up as close call victories. An example of this is how Hillary Clinton won the 
popular vote in the 2016 election, but only received the most votes in 487 out of 
approximately 3100 counties. This, they claim, makes it almost impossible to draw districting 
maps in Wisconsin that comply with both traditional districting principles and the one-person, 
one-vote principle, but does not result in a large number of “wasted” votes (Wisconsin State 
Senate and Wisconsin State Assembly, 2017: 31-35). 
 
Political scientist Eric McGhee, who is one of the developers of the efficiency gap, filed an 
amicus brief in favor of neither party. He wants to make it very clear that he is not arguing 
against or in favor of the lower court’s decision. He is only writing the brief to explain the 
efficiency gap and make sure that the Supreme Court’s decision is not based on a 
misunderstanding of how the efficiency gap works and how it may be used in analyzes of 
legislative district maps. The all-votes-may-have-influence argument criticizes the concept of 
wasted voters, but McGhee argues that it overlooks how winning more seats without winning 
over more voters is the main point of a partisan gerrymander. The reason that it raises 
concerns when one party’s votes are less effectively turned into legislative seats due to 
partisan gerrymandering is exactly because votes from all legitimate voters are so valued in a 
democracy. He is also referring to scholarly work that shows that the margin of victory in an 
election has little effect on how a legislator votes on bills. By contrast, the effect of changing 
a legislator with one from another party has a huge effect. There is also the technology 
available that enables legislators to screen constituents and reject the inquiries of persons the 
data set deems it unlikely to vote for the incumbent. This goes against the argument that a 
legislator represents all constituents in his or her district, and exacerbates the lack of 
representation for citizens who have been gerrymandered (McGhee, 2017: 18-20).   
 
McGhee also argues that the efficiency gap is not biased towards Democrats. The 1970s and 
1980s saw maps that generally had a gap in favor of the Democrats, while newer maps tend to 
be in favor of the Republicans. That is not surprising considering how the Republican Party 
controls a large number of the state legislatures. Their research also found that redistricting 
under unified Democratic control shifts the gap in a favor of the Democrats by about as much 
as redistricting under unified Republican control shifts it in the Republicans’ favor. He thinks 
that many of those who oppose the theory of the efficiency gap do not really have a problem 
with the gap per se, but is against the concept of partisan symmetry as a measure of fairness. 
They are more likely to believe that traditional districting principles like respect for 
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jurisdictional boundaries, contiguity and compactness are a better indicator of fairness than 
giving left-of-median and-right-of-median voters equal opportunities to achieve a legislative 
majority. He also refutes appellants claim that the efficiency gap requires proportional 
representation. Nothing about the efficiency gap or any other of the suggested symmetry 
metrics demands proportional representation in any way. Quite contrary, a gap of zero implies 
not that but a 2:1 “winner’s bonus”, where the seat margins are about twice as large as the 
vote margins (McGhee, 2017: 25-29). 
 
The mathematician Dr Eric S. Lander is an expert in the scientific analysis of large datasets 
and has filed an amicus brief where he argues for the need of a judicially manageable standard 
for recognizing excessive partisan gerrymandering to have a quantitative foundation. All the 
nine justices in Vieth v. Jubelirer agreed that excessively partisan gerrymandering is harmful 
to the democratic form of government of the United States, but the Supreme Court struggled 
to agree upon a manageable standard that recognizes when a district plan unconstitutionally 
interferes with fair and effective representation for all citizens (Lander, 2017: 7-10).  
 
Dr Lander claims that a major reason for this struggle has been that the court has tried to use 
qualitative criteria to define excessiveness. He believes that excessiveness is a quantitative 
concept and that recent advantages in technology have made it possible to measure the degree 
of partisan bias in a plan and whether it is extreme or not. The Supreme Court needs to find a 
manageable standard for partisan gerrymandering, as the technological advancements is 
bringing new threats from those who wish to create even more extreme and resilient 
gerrymanders. Objective guidance using quantitative measures can provide the foundation of 
such a manageable judicial standard. (Lander, 2017: 7-10). Dr Lander wants the 
excessiveness of a districting plan to be measured by comparing it to the distribution of 
outcomes of all possible plans that fulfill the declared redistricting goals of the state. The 
distribution of outcomes shows the results in electoral seats won with different voting levels 
under the plan. However, he is also open to other measures of partisan outcome, such as the 




5.3.5 On traditional redistricting standards 
Not everyone who filed an amicus brief seem to think that there needs to be established a new 
partisan gerrymandering standard. Some, like the Tennessee State Senators, feel like the 
traditional redistricting standards are all that is needed and that further standards will engage 
the courts in making political determinations. Gerrymandering has been a part of American 
politics for centuries and was a well-known phenomenon at the time when the Constitution 
was written. But the Constitution does not say anything one how legislative and congressional 
districts should be drawn, and does not forbid political considerations when districts are 
drawn (Tennessee State Senators, 2017: 3).  
 
The Tennessee State Senators argue that new standards like the efficiency gap try to bring on 
a proportional system that changes the nature of representation from a district-based one to an 
ideological- and party-based system. A system where the elected officials are only responsive 
to their interest group, rather than to all voters within their district (Tennessee State Senators, 
2017: 39). As the Legacy Foundation adds, several previous Supreme Court cases have 
already rejected any constitutional claim to a proportional representation system. Nor does the 
Wisconsin Constitution guarantee any right to proportional representation (Legacy 
Foundation, 2017: 12-13).  
 
The Congress has the power to regulate election districting and has done so several times, 
such as establishing that “Representatives must be elected from single-member districts 
composed of contiguous territory”. These traditional redistricting standards are enough to 
prevent the worst malpractice (Legacy Foundation, 2017: 12-13). The National Republican 
Congressional Committee agrees with this and points to the fact that compactness, contiguity, 
incumbent protection and respect for jurisdictional boundaries have all been identified as 
traditional redistricting criteria by the Supreme Court and are used to determine if specific 
districts are too gerrymandered. But “Act 43 meets all of the typical traditional districting 
criteria that are used as evidence to determine if specific districts are impermissible 
gerrymanders” (National Republican Congressional Committee, 2017: 19-20). 
 
5.3.6 Individual choice or predictable voter behavior  
One of the points being debated in the amicus briefs is the predictability of voter behavior. 
Their viewpoints differ on how much one can read from data on previous elections and the 
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role district-specific factors plays into an individual voter’s decision-making. The appellees 
claim in this case is that the Act 43 redistricting is an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander 
that uses tactics like cracking and packing on Democratic voters. To evaluate a claim like 
that, one needs to know how many Democrats live in each district. The Wisconsin 
Manufacturers & Commerce claims that by using previous election results and statistical 
analysis based on this to prove it, the appellees have lost sight of the basic truths when it 
comes to a voter’s decision making. They feel that the theory the plaintiffs, Whitford et al., 
has presented and the evidence they have brought forward completely disregards the role that 
individual choice and change over time plays. Due to this, the theory of the case fails both 
conceptually and legally (Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, 2017: 14-15). 
 
An amicus brief sent in by Political Science Professors goes against this and points out that 
predictable and stable voter behavior is an important reason for why mapmakers are able to 
create redistricting maps with a durable partisan bias. While partisan identity is not the only 
factor that matters, partisan identity is one of the strongest predictors of voter preferences and 
can be used to predict voter behavior with a high degree of confidence. They provide data that 
shows how party preference has both become more stable and increased in intensity. When 
you combine this with the wealth of data available to mapmakers about voters and the new 
and advanced statistical and map-making applications that can be used to create maps, one 
has the potential for extreme gerrymanders like Act 43 in Wisconsin (Political Science 
Professors, 2017: 4-6).  
 
While the Wisconsin legislature and their supporters tries to argue that election results are 
decided by factors like incumbency and individual candidate differences, those where not the 
factors they relied upon when they drafted Act 43. Instead, it used statistical analyses of 
historical voting data to project the durability of a Republican legislative majority against 
various shifts in party strength. The Republican majority in Wisconsin spent close to half a 
million dollars on advanced computer analysis by outside consultants. Why would they do 
that if, as it is argued, past results were not really relevant for future voting results? The 
Center for Media & Democracy argues that the appellants used modern technology to create 
as many safe districts as possible and reduced the number of meaningfully competitive 
districts in half in the process. The analytical projections for safe districts did not factor in any 
district-specific factors, like candidate strength or incumbency, but was calculated from data 
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on party preference in existing and proposed districts (Center for Media and Democracy, 
2017: 15-16).  
 
A brief filed by 44 Election Law, Scientific Evidence, and Empirical Legal Scholars also 
highlight that through their pursuit of partisan advantage in generating alternative maps and 
searching for feasibility constraints when checking for compliance with traditional maps, the 
drafters of Act 43 made it clear that they did not have any legitimate legislative objective. 
Their goal was to create a partisan advantage, which has been observed in the 2012 and 2014 
election results and is likely to persist through the lifespan of Act 43 (44 Election Law, 2017: 
1-3). 
 
5.3.7 On unrepresentative governments and the loss of legitimacy 
Many of the amicus briefs filed in support of the appellees talks about how extreme partisan 
gerrymandering locks in a delegation of legislative representatives that does not come close to 
reflecting the partisan diversity of the state’s populace. This undermines the legislative 
representativeness and makes it less certain that the legislature will be accountable to all of 
the people it is supposed to represent. The necessity of actually representative government, 
the Brennan Center at N.Y.U. School of Law writes, was clear to the founding fathers. One 
example of this is how Article 1, §2 of the Constitution requires reallocation of House seats 
every ten years. This increases their legislative representativeness by taking population shifts 
and growth into account (Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. School of Law, 2017: 27-30) 
 
The unrepresentative and uncompetitive districts that partisan gerrymandering produce has a 
corrosive effect on our democracy, according to the Senators John McCain and Sheldon 
Whitehouse. They quote Alexander Hamilton writing, “The true principle of a republic is that 
the people should choose whom they please to govern them”.  That principle is undermined 
with the use of partisan gerrymandering. This practice turns it around, now you have the 
representatives choosing their constituents every ten years.  They believe that when partisan 
gerrymandering is used to create safe seats, the elected politicians will be more reluctant to 
reach across the aisle and work on bipartisan legislation, as their main threat in elections will 
come during the primaries. Instead, you will get more partisanship and polarization. Another 
legitimacy problem is the lack of transparency in how redistricting is funded. Dark money 
increases the risk that elected officials have the interest of powerful and wealthy groups in 
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their mind, rather than the electorate they are supposed to represent. The senators show how 
all of this contributes to Americans checking out of the democratic process entirely, and 
reference that the voter turnout in 2014 was the lowest in any election since 1942 (McCain 
and Whitehouse, 2017: 16-19).  
 
The bipartisan group of 65 Current and Former State Legislators is in agreement with the 
senators on the problems partisan gerrymandering causes to bipartisanship. When the district 
is considered safe, the candidates find it necessary to first and foremost appeal to the primary 
voters of their party, who are usually farther from the ideological center than the average 
voter. Candidates in safe districts do not really have to temper their views in the general 
election either, since party identification is so high that they rarely have to reach outside the 
party base to win. The lack of competitive districts lead to legislators that do not reflect the 
ideological preference of the people they represent. The legislator is only responsive to the 
30% percent of voters he needs to win the primary, which gives little incentive to work with 
legislators from the other party or work on moderate policies (65 Current and Former State 
Legislators, 2017: 15-17).  
 
5.3.8 The question of justiciability 
A couple of the filed amicus briefs would also argue that this case provides the Supreme 
Court with the opportunity to once and for all clarify the justiciability of partisan 
gerrymandering. The Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty shows that previous court cases 
have given conflicting precedents and while a majority in Davis v. Bandemer found that 
partisan gerrymandering was a justiciable question, neither that Court nor any later Supreme 
Court has been able to find a limited and precise standard for gerrymandering cases. A 
fractured result, like in Davis v. Bandemer and Vieth v. Jubelirer would keep district courts in 
a sort of litigation limbo, where it is not clear what the rule of law should be. Recognition 
from the Supreme Court that these questions are unjusticiable, they feel, would both 
acknowledge the reality of redistricting and relieve the courts of the uncertainty (Wisconsin 
Institute for Law & Liberty, 2017: 4-17) 
 
The brief filed by Common Cause argues for the opposite. The Supreme Court has previously 
said that partisan gerrymanders are incompatible with democratic principles and held in 
several cases that claims of partisan gerrymandering are justiciable. Using the framework 
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Justice Kennedy laid out in Vieth v. Jubelirer, based on the First Amendment, the Supreme 
Court should be able to clear out a path for gerrymandering cases. Common Cause argues 
“when a State targets individuals for unfavorable treatment because of their politics, that 
action is unconstitutional unless the State demonstrates narrow tailoring and a compelling 





6. The constitutionality of gerrymandering and a manageable 
standard 
 
This chapter will discuss the findings from the case. The research question was “Does 
partisan gerrymandering violate the Constitution of the United States of America?” The parts 
of the Constitution partisan gerrymandering is claimed to be a violation of is the First 
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment. I will therefore go in detail on those two. It also 
becomes a discussion of other important questions the Supreme Court will have to decide on 
in Gill v. Whitford. Is partisan gerrymandering justiciable and could plaintiffs have a 
statewide claim? At the end, I will discuss how a manageable standard might look like, based 
on previous Supreme Court decisions, the District Court’s ruling and suggestions from 
plaintiffs.  
 
6.1 Unrepresentative government and legitimacy 
Partisan gerrymandering has been a part of American politics for almost as long as politics 
has existed in the United States. While advancements in computer technology have helped 
partisan gerrymandering become more effective the last decades, another important factor is 
that people to a larger degree than before choose to self-segregate and live in areas with 
likeminded individuals.  While partisan gerrymandering has been criticized by many, both 
parties have been willing to use it when they had the opportunity to get a legislative advantage 
and the courts have preferred to stay out of it. One of the biggest issues with gerrymandering 
is that it could hurt the legitimacy of elected representatives and result in delegations of 
legislative representatives that does not come close to reflect the partisan diversity of the 
voters in the state. As the Brennan Center at N.Y.U School of Law writes in its amicus brief, 
Article 1, §2 of the Constitution that requires reallocation of House seats every ten years is an 
example of the founding fathers intention of a representative government. By taking 
population shifts and growth into account, they aimed to increase the legislative 
representativeness of voters, but partisan gerrymandering does the exact opposite. The 
Senators McCain and Whitehouse believes that this is contributing to Americans diminishing 
interest in elections and reference that the voter turnout in 2014 was the lowest in any election 
since 1942.  
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Polling suggests that very few Americans, on either side of the aisle, approve of partisan 
gerrymandering, but the Supreme Court has been reluctant to do much about it (Frankovic, 
2017). They have viewed it as a “political thicket” that should be solved by politicians and 
that entering into it would bring on a flood wave of cases for the court system. When looking 
at the remarks from justices in previous cases and from the oral arguments, they all seem to 
agree that partisan gerrymandering is a distasteful practice that would like to see disappear, 
but there is a big disagreement about whether courts could or should get involved controlling 
such practice.  
 
6.2 Standing  
An important point of contention for the parties was whether the plaintiffs have the standing 
to bring a statewide claim. The amicus briefs in support of the state of Wisconsin thought that 
the District Court has made a mistake when it held that the plaintiffs had a statewide standing 
to challenge the district map, as the Supreme Court had previously rejected attempts to 
challenge gerrymandered districts the plaintiff does not live in. Most of the Democratic voters 
who are plaintiffs in this case live in Democratic districts, not in the districts they claim to 
have lost due to gerrymandering. The Republican Nation Committee showed examples from 
racial gerrymandering cases, where a voter in a racially gerrymandered district could be 
denied equal treatment, but that the voter could not be discriminated against based on the 
racial distribution of districts he does not live in. The District Court held that the basis for 
partisan gerrymandering is different from that of a racial gerrymandering claim. They are not 
contrary either, as the claims in racial gerrymandering cases are limited to the effect the 
gerrymander has on one or a few districts, while partisan gerrymandering claims are based on 
the statewide effect it has. Whitford and the other plaintiffs allege that all partisan 
gerrymandering claims previously brought to the Supreme Court has been statewide and are 
certain that they have the standing to pursue if the Court finds partisan gerrymandering to be 
justiciable.  
 
The decision on standing could come down to the justices’ view of representation. Mr. 
Tseytlin, who represented the state of Wisconsin at the oral arguments, pushed the argument 
that in a country with a single district election system, people only vote in their own district. 
He argued that while one might have a vague interest in the party you associate with to have 
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more members in Congress, for instance, but that no one would argue that a Wisconsin 
Republican could challenge Texas law if he thought Texas Republicans to be 
underrepresented. This would be similar to a statewide claim in his opinion. To only look at 
the district someone can vote in is a very dyadic view of representation. Justice Kennedy 
asked if it would change the calculus if the claim was based on the First Amendment instead 
of the Fourteenth (Gill v. Whitford Oral Arguments: 4-5). While Tseytlin disagreed with this 
as well, it might have been a suggestion from Kennedy that plaintiffs could have a First 
Amendment interest in having their preferred political party be strong. Even though the 
overall results of elections seem to matter a lot, there is not necessarily a constitutional basis 
for considering the House of Representatives or a state assembly in that way. The Supreme 
Court has previously denied that the result of congressional elections as a whole can be used 
as evidence of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering. The Court seems split on the 
standing issue now, with Chief Justice Roberts and the three other conservative justices 
reacting negatively to Kennedy’s suggestion. If Kennedy were to side with them, it would 
allow the Supreme Court to avoid ruling on the merits of the case. However, if he sides with 
the four liberal justices, like his comments might indicate, the Court will face some tough 
questions: is partisan gerrymandering unconstitutional, is partisan gerrymandering cases 
something the courts should get involved with, and if so, what standard should they use to 
review such claims? 
 
6.3 Is it justiciable? 
The issue of making partisan gerrymandering justiciable has been a long process. The first 
time it was implemented in a district court was in Bandemer v. Davis in 1984, where the 
Republican legislature’s redistricting plan was ruled to be unconstitutional. The reasoning for 
the ruling was the systematic dilution of Democratic voting strength in Indiana. When the 
appeal reached the Supreme Court in 1986, its ruling agreed that partisan gerrymandering was 
a justiciable issue. They did not, however, find that Indiana Democrats had proved that they 
were permanently harmed and there was a lack of a clear consensus on what would make a 
plan unacceptable (Morill, 1987: 246).  
 
While partisan gerrymandering is viewed as justiciable for now, there are still questions about 
its constitutionality and how to measure it. The Supreme Court has been much clearer on 
racial gerrymandering and has struck down several cases of it, both where minorities have 
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been underrepresented and where lawmakers have been to creative when creating majority-
minority districts. But some people view different forms of gerrymandering as two sides of 
the same coin. As Robert G. Dixon, former assistant attorney general of the United States and 
professor of law, pointed out in 1971: “In a functional sense the gerrymandering issue is the 
same whether the districts are single-member or multi-member – and whether or not a racial 
factor is present, because racial gerrymandering is simply a particular kind of political 
gerrymandering” (Grofman, 2007: 19). 
 
6.4 Is partisan gerrymandering a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment? 
“When you’re talking about the opportunity to turn your vote into a policy or change, the 
Fourteenth Amendment says you should have an equal chance, whether you’re a Democrat or 
a Republican,” said Ruth Greenwood, who is the deputy director for redistricting at Campaign 
Legal Center, which represents the original plaintiffs in Gill v. Whitford. She adds: “But if 
you’re a Republican in Wisconsin, you get an outsized say with your vote. And if you’re a 
Democrat in Rhode Island, you get an outsized say” (Wines, 2017) 
 
Those who argue that partisan gerrymandering violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment claims that by diluting the vote of people with a certain political 
belief, they deny a political party the share of seats in the legislature that they otherwise 
would be entitled to based on the share of votes it received in the election. The Equal 
Protection Clause has been the framework for many cases dealing with representation, 
including vote dilution since Reynolds v. Sims. This was the case where the Supreme Court 
articulated the “one person, one vote” rule for legislative apportionment and held that each 
voter was not only entitled to cast a ballot, but had a constitutional right to an equally 
weighted vote as any other voter (Briffault, 2005: 402). 
 
The protection of an individual voter’s rights has also been extended to racial minority 
groups. The Supreme Court has agreed that attempts to make it harder for minority voters to 
elect their preferred candidates, in other words dilute their vote, falls under the Equal 
Protection Clause. Extending it to partisan gerrymandering grows naturally from the case law 
that brought “one man, one vote”. A redistricting map that gives one party a larger share of 
seats in the legislative assembly than its share of the popular vote, while giving the other party 
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a lesser share of the seats than its votes can sound like it denies the latter party’s voters fair 
representation. (Briffault, 2005: 405) 
 
There are arguments against this viewpoint though. The vote dilution model of 
gerrymandering assumes that voters fall into identifiable partisan groups, so a party’s share of 
the voters can be compared to its share of seats in the legislature. But that is not always the 
case, as voters can change the party they vote for without changing party registration, many 
are unregistered and voters can split their ticket and vote for candidates from different parties 
for different positions in the same election. The actual votes in an election can be affected by 
other factors like voters staying home because of one-party domination, specific candidate 
qualities or scandals. Though these are more practical worries, there are also objections to the 
theory. The claim is that the theory of vote dilution, or something similar like the efficiency 
gap, is basically a wish for proportional representation. Proportional representation is not 
mentioned in the Constitution and would also be hard to achieve as the law for congressional 
elections requires single-member districts and virtually every state legislature has it as well. 
You could have a party that ends up with 51% of the popular vote and 100% of the legislature 
seats, even if the two dominant parties were evenly spread out in a state (Briffault, 2005: 405-
407).  
 
Justice Scalia challenged the arguments for political gerrymandering’s unconstitutionality in 
the plurality opinion on Vieth v. Jubelirer. He asserted that only individual voters, and not 
political groups, had the right to equal treatment provided under the Equal Protection Clause 
of the 14th Amendment. The plaintiff’s proposed standard in Vieth v. Jubelirer was based on 
majority rule, that a majority of voters should be able to elect a majority of voters. But recent 
work in mathematical voting theory published after the case in 2004 addresses the challenge 
posed by Scalia and argues that a majority rule standard can be derived from the equal 
treatment of individual voters, with no argument about group rights. The claim that partisan 
gerrymandering is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause is an extension of the 
claims that was made in Wesberry v. Sanders and Reynolds v. Sims. Those cases found that 
the right to vote was protected by the Constitution, which included protection from the 
dilution of people’s vote by unequally sized districts and that nearly as is practicable one 
man’s vote should be worth as much as another’s. If diluting a person’s vote by creating 
unequally sized districts violates their right to vote, then it is not a huge leap to assume that 
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manipulation of district shapes that has the same effect would also be in violation (McGann, 
Smith, Latner and Keena, 2015: 296-297) 
 
An equal treatment of all individuals would indicate that the majority of voters should be able 
to elect a majority of representatives. In a two-party system, the largest party must therefore 
receive a majority of the popular vote and receive more seats than the other party. But that 
assumes that the legislature is considered as a whole, and that we do not view it by individual 
districts. I have previously talked about two of the primary ways to view representation. One 
way is to consider the House [or the state legislature in Wisconsin] as a whole as a single 
legislative body who represents the people. If the overall composition of the House is stacked 
against you, then you have been wronged. The other way is a more district based or dyadic 
way to view representation. This view assumes that if the process that your representative was 
chosen by is fair, then you would have received equal protection. Each election is viewed 
separately, each representative is treated as an individual as opposed to a member of a 
representative body and you cannot argue that the overall process that elected the Congress 
was discriminatory towards you. As you only get to vote for the member from you district, it 
is assumed that the only one who represents you is that member, not the House as a whole.  
 
The laws and action performed by a legislature depend on the legislature as a whole and not 
just on its individual members. Since legislatures organize themselves on partisan lines, the 
partisan balance becomes an important part of the election result. The newspaper headlines 
after an election are likely to focus on who won the House or who kept control of the State 
Assembly, rather than that there were separate elections between separate candidates in 
separate districts. When Article 1, §2 of the Constitution prescribes the election of 
representatives to the House in collective terms: “The House of Representatives shall be 
composed of members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States”. There 
is nothing in that sentence to indicate that a voter is only representative and thus do not have a 
stake in how the rest of Congress look like. But to consider the overall composition of a 
legislative body only makes sense if we view it in partisan terms. While the partisan nature of 
politics is often taken for granted, might not be as straightforward in legal terms. The 
Constitution does not mention political parties and Justice Scalia argued in Vieth v. Jubelirer 
that parties have no special status. In his mind they were comparable to social groups like 
farmers of Christian fundamentalists. However, political parties are different from those 
categories by the fact that the legislatures actually organize themselves on partisan lines, for 
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instance when it comes to choosing the Speaker of the House and congressional committees. 
This means that political parties have become an institutionalized part of Congress. This 
makes a case for why the results perhaps should be viewed as a whole and considered in 
partisan terms (McGann, Smith, Latner and Keena: 298-301) 
 
The Democrats in Wisconsin do not only base their case on the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but are also saying that their First Amendment right are being 
violated. By drawing a partisan legislative map, the state render Democratic votes less worth 
than Republican ones, which amounts to government-ordered punishment of Democratic 
voters for expressing their political preference at the ballot box. Based on previous Supreme 
Court cases, the arguments in the amicus briefs and the oral arguments from Gill v. Whitford 
and Benisek v. Lamone, it seems like the basis for a decision will be found in the First 
Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause protects the voter from having the their 
representation rights burdened, but to view gerrymandering as that would indicate a collective 
view of representation. Otherwise the Court might just view it as political classifications 
playing a role in the districting. That has traditionally been accepted as a permissible 
classification and would need a standard that shows when it is used for an impermissible 
purpose. Whether you believe that partisan gerrymandering is a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is in most cases a reflection of your view on representation. Based on previous 
cases, I am inclined to believe that it is not a breach of the Equal Protection Clause. The Gill 
v. Whitford case could go either way on this, but the signals indicate that most of the focus 
will be on the First Amendment, where I believe they have a better case. As Justice Kennedy 
wrote in his Vieth v. Jubelirer opinion,  
“First Amendment analysis does not dwell on whether a generally permissible classification 
has been used for an impermissible purpose, but concentrates on whether the legislation 
burdens the representation rights of the complaining party’s voters for reasons of ideology, 
beliefs, or political association” (Vieth v. Jubelirer, 2004).  
 
6.5 Is partisan gerrymandering a violation of the First Amendment? 
Justice Kennedy has previously suggested that partisan gerrymandering could be 
unconstitutional because of the First Amendment, and not because it violates the Equal 
Protection Clause, which has been the primary argument in previous Supreme Court cases. 
The thing that makes the First Amendment a possibility is that it is focuses on whether the 
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government punishes or favors a particular viewpoint. The Equal Protection Clause is focused 
on hindering discrimination on the basis of protected characteristics like race, religion and 
gender, but it does not care as much about if a law discriminates based on political views. 
 
When the government wants to create an effective gerrymander, it classifies individuals by 
their political affiliation and draws districts that are designed to dilute their votes cast in favor 
of the minority party. While the voters are still able to cast their ballots, their ability to elect 
their preferred candidates are diminished. Voting is a fundamental free speech activity and 
opponents of partisan gerrymandering would argue that when the state diminishes the vote of 
voters with a certain political leaning, it is a form of viewpoint discrimination as the 
government punishes individuals who support a disfavored party (Stern, 2017). The First 
Amendment guarantees free expression and association, but they are not really free if the state 
can punish you for your viewpoint by diluting the value of your vote.    
 
Knowing that the key to get a favorable Supreme Court ruling is probably to get the vote of 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, who has been a strong voice against infringement on the freedom 
of speech, the Democratic plaintiffs in Gill v. Whitford has made the First Amendment central 
to their case. Gerrymandering has traditionally been seen as an issue that may infringe on the 
equal protection of the law and therefore fall under the Fourteenth Amendment. But the idea 
that partisan gerrymandering could be in violation of the First Amendment was one that 
Kennedy himself had suggested in Vieth v. Jubelirer in 2004. During the oral arguments in 
the ongoing case, Paul Smith, the lawyer that represents the Democratic challengers in Gill v. 
Whitford, read out loud the argument Kennedy had previously laid out. “First Amendment 
concerns arise where a state enacts a law that has the purpose and effect of subjecting a group 
of voters or their party to disfavored treatment by reason of their views. In the context of 
partisan gerrymandering, that means that First Amendment concerns arise where an 
apportionment has the purpose and effect of burdening a group of voters’ representational 
rights” (Toobin, 2017)  
 
Though a partisan gerrymander could make a party’s voters less effective less effective in 
converting their votes into legislative representatives, the argument against it being a violation 
of the First Amendment rests on the fact that they still have the same right to vote, nominate 
their preferred candidate and participate in campaign. They way gerrymandering harms a 
party is by making it harder to win their “fair share” of representatives in the legislature. And 
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that is something that is not present in the Constitution and sounds similar to proportional 
representation (Briffault, 2005: 409). 
 
From looking at the arguments made in the case, I do believe that partisan gerrymandering is 
a form of viewpoint discrimination. While voters have individual choice and could change 
their partisan preference from one election to the next, partisan gerrymandering assumes voter 
behavior, attempts to dilute their voting strength and penalizes individuals who vote for the 
disfavored party. Free expression and association, as the First Amendment guarantees, are not 
really free if the government can punish you for your viewpoint by ensuring your vote doesn’t 
matter. My opinion is strengthened by the fact that the Supreme Court has chosen to take 
another partisan gerrymandering, Benisek v. Lamone from Maryland, which is framed 
exclusively as a First Amendment challenge. Based on the arguments, it appears that a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment would require more substantial proof of harm over 
time, while a state that moves voters based on their political affiliations for the purpose of 
partisan advantage could be in violation of the First Amendment just from the purpose itself. 
It would need to have a legitimate justification for doing so, regardless of the actual voting 
results. This would give partisan gerrymandering a judicial status more in line with racial 
gerrymandering. 
 
6.6 How will a manageable standard look like? 
If the Supreme Court rules that partisan gerrymandering is justiciable and in violation of the 
Constitution, it will still need to decide on a standard that redistricting cases can be judged by. 
There needs to be simple way of knowing when a redistricting crosses the line and becomes 
an unconstitutional gerrymander. The standard cannot seek to enforce proportional 
representation, that is something the Supreme Court, and Justice Kennedy specifically, has 
made clear. A workable standard needs to stop those instances where a redistricting process 
results in grossly disproportionate electoral outcomes compared to the partisan composition of 
the voters, while not being so squishy that the courts will be flooded with weak partisan-based 
redistricting challenges. The entrenchment part of Judge Ripple’s ruling separates it from the 
focus on whether one party won their fair share of seats, which was more in focus in Vieth v. 
Jubelirer. The opinion from the District Court makes entrenchment a central part of a 
judicially manageable standard when evaluating a partisan gerrymander. It focuses on 
whether a legislature has used the redistricting process to not only favor one political party, 
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but also entrench it in power for several elections going forward (Whitford v. Gill District 
Court Opinion, 2016: 59). The harm here is not just to the other political party, but is also a 
detriment to democracy itself as it prevents voters from holding elected officials accountable 
at the ballot box. This is also a representational issue, as a representative entrenched in a safe 
district have little reason to be responsive to the political minorities in their district. It is hard 
to view someone as representing the whole district if they can dismiss a large part of the 
electorate.  
 
As the history of partisan gerrymandering in the courts have shown, it is hard to find a 
manageable standard that eliminates the most blatant partisanship, but allows some leeway for 
state governments to operate. One example of how the Supreme Court could distinguish 
between excessive and permissible attention to a districting factor, like partisanship, is the 
doctrine that came from Shaw v. Reno on racial gerrymandering. The doctrine that came was 
that excessive attention to race, where it became the predominant factor in the drawing of 
district lines, is not allowed, while some attention to race in districting is permitted. The 
potential issue with a similar doctrine is the vague standard it sets and partisanship is present 
in a larger number of districts than racial divisions exist in. But Shaw v. Reno’s restriction on 
attention to race seem to have been absorbed in the political process and have become part of 
redistricting practice. Even states where race is a real factor in politics have seen little racial 
gerrymandering once the doctrine became internalized (Briffault, 2005: 419-420). 
 
A standard for partisan gerrymandering needs to be both scientifically and legally valid. To be 
scientifically valid, it must be a correct measure of the thing we are trying to capture. Whether 
the measure is accurate or not does not matter if we are measuring the wrong thing. The 
standard also need be legally valid, in that it needs to have its basis in a constitutionally 
protected right and it needs to give clear guidance for judicial decision-making. Other 
qualities the standards should have is reliability and predictability in results and have similar 
cases give similar results (McGann, Smith, Latner and Keena, 2015: 309) The District Court’s 
opinion was based on a legal test that considered discriminatory intent, the partisan effects of 
the district map and whether the effects were justified by some other reasons. The plaintiffs 
suggested the efficiency gap as a tool to measure the partisan effect and argued that gaps over 
7 percent violated the constitution. The 7 percent standard is meant to capture maps that will 
have gaps that endure the whole 10-year election cycle until the next redistricting, but critics 
have argued that it is an arbitrary number. It was not used by the District Court, but Judge 
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Ripple did say that the efficiency gap corroborated the conclusion the majority had come to 
(Liptak, 2017b).  
 
6.7 Previous cases will shape its form 
From the way the plaintiffs in Gill v. Whitford has laid out their case, it looks like they have 
taken Justice Kennedy’s objections from previous gerrymandering cases like Vieth v. 
Jubelirer and LULAC v. Perry to heart. Some of their complaints and solutions seems tailored 
to appeal to him and Kennedy’s own words were used several times by the plaintiffs during 
the hearing further their case (Toobin, 2017). Justice Kennedy presented his concerns with 
partisan symmetry in the plurality opinion from LULAC v. Perry. He observed that to 
determine how symmetric a district plan is, one must estimate the results of a hypothetical 
election where certain voters switch their vote to the other party and that this estimation 
requires conjecture about where those possible vote-switchers reside. These assumptions can 
be controversial and often incorrect. He was also skeptical of invalidating district plans based 
on hypothetical unfair results from future elections. Kennedy preferred that a challenge was 
litigated only if the feared inequality had taken place in elections (Stephanopoulos and 
McGhee, 2015: 845).  
 
These two objections apply primarily to the partisan bias as a measure, but might not be 
applicable to the efficiency gap. The assumption of switching the parties’ vote share by the 
same amount in every district is problematic, as the partisan swing is likely to vary from 
district to district. The parties’ wasted votes are calculated from actual election results when 
the efficiency gap is used. Both the analysis of current plans and any historical analysis are 
therefore based on real outcomes and not hypotheticals. Uniform swing can be used in 
sensitivity training, but that is an option, whereas it is a prerequisite for partisan bias. Justice 
Kennedy’s concern with striking down a district plan before the unfair results had occurred 
does not apply to the efficiency gap either. This is again because the efficiency gap is 
calculated from past elections and any unfair results would come from historical experience. 
Since election outcomes can be forecast with reasonable accuracy, it would be unwise for 
partisan actors to create a district map that is certain to break the threshold of the efficiency 
gap. Even though the first election could be held under the new map, it would be very likely 
to be invalidated after the partisan unfair results became clear. The party in power could risk 
that the courts draw a more competitive map with less protection of their incumbents than a 
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district map with some partisan advantage that falls below the threshold would have given 
them (Stephanopoulos and McGhee, 2015: 896-897). 
 
The third concern raised by Justice Kennedy was how one would select the asymmetry 
threshold that decided when a plan that scored lower would be upheld and a plan that scored 
higher would be presumed illegal. Neither the parties nor the amicus briefs of political 
scientists provided the empirical evidence of asymmetry in current or historical district plans, 
which Kennedy thought made it hard for the Supreme Court to find “a standard for deciding 
how much partisan dominance is too much” (Stephanopoulos and McGhee, 2015: 846). 
Deciding on a standard that distinguishes between some partisan unfairness and too much 
partisan unfairness was the main issue in Vieth v. Jubelirer as well. The Vieth Court indicated 
that valid plans could not be told apart from invalid ones based on qualitative standards, as it 
would be hard to judge unfairness or entrenchment with sufficient consistency. A quantitative 
approach is not new to the Supreme Court, as it is already used in cases involving population 
equality in districts. Population deviations above 10 percent in state legislative districts must 
be justified by legitimate policies that make the inequality necessary, while deviations below 
10 percent are assumed to be valid unless it comes from attempts to disadvantage a racial or 
political group (Stephanopoulos and McGhee, 2015: 886). 
 
The suggested use of the efficiency gap as part of a standard could enable a similar doctrine in 
partisan gerrymandering cases as the one using population deviation in reapportionment 
cases. By deciding on a specific efficiency gap level, the Supreme Court would inform both 
politicians and lower courts on exactly how much partisan influence is too much.  
 
6.8 Where do you set the threshold? 
The question then is where do you set the efficiency gap threshold. Ideally district plans 
should probably be close to a gap of zero. That would invalidate any plan that treats parties 
unequal in terms of wasted votes, unless the state can prove that it was necessary due to other 
legitimate state policy, like contiguity or keeping communities of interest intact, or because it 
was unavoidable given the geographic distribution of the parties’ voters. But a threshold of 
zero is not likely and the Supreme Court has made it clear that some partisan considerations 
are allowed. It would also have made almost every current district plan illegal and have a very 
disruptive effect. Another factor that goes into setting the threshold is that a district plan’s 
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electoral gap varies from election to election. This means that even if a plan has a gap of zero 
in one election, it would be likely to have another efficiency gap in the next election even 
under the same map. Some margin should therefore be allowed for. 
 
Stephanopoulos and McGhee (2015: 887-888) recommends setting the limit at two seats for 
congressional plans and 8 percent for state legislature plans, with the additional condition that 
sensitivity testing show the efficiency gap is unlikely to hit zero in the lifetime of the district 
plan. When Stephanopoulos and McGhee looked at the redistricting in the entire period since 
the reapportionment revolution in the 1960’s, they found that their suggested threshold would 
have been breached in 14 percent of the congressional plans and 12 percent of the state 
legislature plans. 
 
A last hope for the plaintiffs could be that the justices end up voting against Act 43 and ruling 
partisan gerrymandering to be unconstitutional, even if they view the standards suggested as, 
in Chief Justice Roberts’ words, “sociological gobbledygook” (Gill v. Whitford Oral 
Arguments, 2017: 40). That would leave it up to a bunch of future cases that would come in 
the aftermath to set a standard, where maybe one day in the future a specific line would be set. 
This would give it a status that resembles that of racial gerrymandering. The process around 
reapportionment was also similar, in that there was not a specific ruling on the details. The 
Supreme Court ruling on apportionment required equal population between districts, but did 
not make a statement on what “equal” would actually mean. The rough threshold of around 10 
percent deviation in population has been established through decades of litigations. A similar 
efficiency gap threshold could emerge organically over a series of cases. 
 
Justice Kennedy has previously shown that he worries less about the long-term implications 
of a ruling than about getting the correct results in the case before him. In cases that test the 
boundaries of established legal principles, you might have to make a decision to correct a 
perceived wrong although there is no administrable standard. Should he find the 
gerrymandering problem to be a big enough democratic problem, than there is a chance 
Kennedy could put his foot down and trust in judges to make the right calls in the 
gerrymandering cases that would be sure to follow (Toobin, 2017). 
 
Kennedy’s fourth objection was that he thought unconstitutional gerrymandering could not be 
judged on partisan asymmetry alone, as it could be a product of other factors than 
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partisanship. Compactness, contiguity, and keeping communities of interests intact are some 
of the other things that map drawers have to consider (Stephanopoulos and McGhee, 2015: 
846). The kind of standard that has been proposed, both by the District Court and by 
Stephanopoulos and McGhee, would only use asymmetry in the one part of the standard. If a 
plan were deemed to be above the threshold for asymmetry, one would get to the second stage 
where you look at other factors like compactness, minority representation and communities of 
interest. Do these factors necessitate that the plan has a gap that is higher than the threshold? 
At this point the court would need to balance partisan fairness against competing 
considerations, which could serve as legitimate justification for plans with an efficiency gap 
over the limit. If a state claims that their district plan needed to breach the threshold in order 
to achieve the other traditional redistricting standards, then they would be presumably be able 
to prove it through cartographic evidence. The plaintiffs should also have the chance to prove 
that the state’s goals could be achieved equally well with a more symmetric district plan.  
 
6.9 Political geography 
The other thing that could excuse a large efficiency gap is the political geography of the state. 
The distribution of each party’s supporters might not make it feasible to create a plan below 
the threshold. Democrats tend to cluster in the city areas, while Republican are more spread 
out in the rural areas and suburban areas can be more mixed. A bias in favor of Republicans 
could therefore be present even without intentional gerrymandering. This is most likely to 
occur in states where Democratic voters are more geographically concentrated than 
Republican voters (Chen and Rodden, 2013: 265). Cartographic evidence would play a key 
part here as well. The state would have to prove that a smaller gap could not have been 
produced and the plaintiff would aim to draw a sample map that illustrates how a smaller 
efficiency gap could have been possible, despite the political geography of the state.  
 
While the political geography of Wisconsin does play a part in explaining of how Republicans 
get more representatives than the amount of voters would normally indicate, it cannot explain 
the large disparate effect seen under Act 43. As Judge Ripple said in the District Court’s 
opinion: “the defendants’ own witnesses produced the most crucial evidence against 
justifying the plan on the basis of political geography” (Whitford v. Gill District Court 
Opinion, 2016: 91). Their testimony established that the drafters of Act 43 produced several 
alternative maps that all would achieved the valid redistricting goals of the legislature, with a 
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substantially smaller partisan advantage. When none of these were used and the legislature 
instead went with a map that secures a Republican electoral majority going forward, it is hard 
to justify the partisan effect by the legitimate state concerns and neutral factors that affect the 
districting process.  
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7. Conclusion 
This paper has looked into partisan gerrymandering, a theme I find very fascinating. It is an 
aspect of American politics that has been in talked about frequently in American media since 
the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case of Gill v. Whitford in the summer of 2017. I have 
used Gill v. Whitford as a case study of partisan gerrymandering, with the research question of 
“Does partisan gerrymandering violate the Constitution of the United States of America?” 
Gerrymandering has a great impact on American politics and it would affect many 
congressional districts and state legislatures if it would be ruled unconstitutional. The claims 
are that it violates the First and the Fourteenth Amendment, so that is the focus of the paper. 
For the Supreme Court to rule against partisan gerrymandering, it would also need to consider 
it a justiciable matter and make a decision on the plaintiffs’ standing in the case. I have 
therefore made those aspects a part of the discussion as well. All indications are that the 
courts would need a manageable standard to judge the merit of future partisan 
gerrymandering cases, should the Supreme Court rule it unconstitutional. I have looked into 
how that standard might look, as it could be of great importance.  
 
It looks like this case will be decided on the merit of the constitutionality. I think it is seen as 
such a pressing issue and an issue that the Supreme Court does not believe elected partisan 
representatives is capable of fixing. Based on the amicus briefs, those in support of the state 
of Wisconsin would like the Court to drop the case based on standing or justiciability, but the 
oral arguments indicate that Justice Kennedy want to have a discussion on partisan 
gerrymandering as a First Amendment issue.  
 
I am very uncertain if partisan gerrymandering is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. It depends on whether you believe it should provide equal chance 
for the legislature as a whole or just equal chance in the election of your representative. 
Where you fall down on that question depends on whether you have a dyadic or collective 
view of representation. The Equal Rights Clause has previously been used to improve 
representation in malapportionment cases and racial discrimination, but seeing the Supreme 
Court rulings from previous makes me believe that they do not believe representation should 
be viewed collectively. Due to this, I believe that partisan gerrymandering is not a violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and that it is more likely to succeed as a First Amendment issue.  
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I do find that voting is a free speech activity and that when the state dilutes the vote of voters 
with a certain political leaning, it becomes a form of viewpoint discrimination. Even if you 
are allowed to cast a vote, your ability to elect your preferred candidate is diminished as a 
result of punishment from the state for previous voting activity. From the amicus briefs and 
the oral arguments it seems like this will be the plaintiffs’ main argument as well, which is an 
argument specifically directed towards Justice Kennedy, who has previously suggested that 
partisan gerrymandering could be a violation of the First Amendments freedom of 
association. The fact that Supreme Court will hear another gerrymandering case, Beniske v. 
Lamone, based around the First Amendment is another indication that it could be vital. The 
First Amendment guarantees free expression and association, but I believe partisan 
gerrymandering violates that when it is used to punish individuals for their viewpoint by 
diminishing their vote.  
 
With regards to how a manageable standard could be designed, I believe the three-pronged 
test that the District Court adopted could work well. A district plan would be found to violate 
the Constitution if it had a discriminatory intent. If it was created with the motive of favoring 
one party over the other, it would fail the first prong. The second prong would be to look at 
the effect. Does the plan waste one party’s voters to a larger degree than the other party’s and 
is the effect durable? The efficiency gap comes across as the best measurement of the effect. 
The maximum gap allowed should be set around 8, to allow for some partisan maneuvering, 
other redistricting goals and variation from one election to the election. The third prong would 
be to investigate if any other legitimate factors could justify the discriminatory effect. One 
would have to consider political geography, compactness and keeping communities intact, 
and whether those goals could only be achieved by breaching the standard. 
 
The fear of some is that a ruling against partisan gerrymandering would shift the 
responsibility of districting from elected public officials to unelected judges, who would 
decide the fate of maps based upon the battle of experts. The court may right a current wrong, 
but down the road it could be more deeply embedded in legislative processes than the 
Constitution intended. This shift in balance between institutions is something many fear, as 
the federal government and the courts will be more involved in what was previously the 
prerogative of local government. I do not believe that would be the long-term effect from it. It 
seems more likely to me that after a couple of cases it where the courts establishes how a new 
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standard works, it would become just another part of the redistricting framework, like the 
standard on population equality. 
 
What is at stake in Gill v. Whitford is politicians’ ability to use the redistricting process to 
their advantage. While Democrats have willingly taken advantage the redistricting process in 
the past, and continue to do so in some of the few states they control both chambers of the 
state legislature and the governorship, a Supreme Court decision that rules partisan 
gerrymandering to be unconstitutional would hurt the Republican Party the most. They 
control the state government trifecta in 25 states, while Democrats hold similar control in only 
6 states and are in most cases forced into a bipartisan redistricting process. The Associated 
Press analyzed the outcomes of all 435 U.S. House races and about 4700 state House and 
Assembly seats that were up for election in 2016 by using the efficiency gap and found that 
four times as many states had Republican-skewed state House or Assembly districts than 
Democratic ones. Among the two dozed most populated states, nearly three times as many 
had Republican-tilted districts to the House of Representatives (Associated Press, 2017). Most 
court cases are judged by previous jurisprudence and conventional legal interpretation, but 
being the decision makers in partisan political cases could lead to more partisanship from 
judges as well and could affect their standing in the eye of the public as neutral arbiters. But 
one can also question if they actually are viewed as neutral, considering how they are chosen 
by politicians and are usually reliably liberal or conservative. The fact that a Supreme Court 
ruling against partisan gerrymandering would most likely hurt Republicans could have 
influenced why the court surprisingly added Benisek v. Lamone to their docket. The justices 
may fear that making a ruling that indicates that they take sides with one of the parties could 
damage the Supreme Court’s legitimacy. 
 
If the Supreme Court votes to allow continued partisan gerrymandering, then it will continue 
to be a feature of American politics, as it has been for centuries. Research indicates that it has 
become more extreme in recent redistricting cycles, as more advanced technology is 
available, voters have become more partisan and people are self-segregating with others of 
similar political views. This trend seems likely to continue and the district maps following the 
2020 election could be the most gerrymandered so far. What the ruling says about 
justiciability could decide if other partisan gerrymandering cases will come before the 
Supreme Court in the future or whether Gill v. Whitford is the one that settles the question.  
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This paper has highlighted some of the most important aspects of the discussion around 
partisan gerrymandering. As for further research on this subject, that would depend on the 
outcome of Gill v. Whitford. It would be very interesting to research the effect it has on the 
next redistricting cycle following the elections of 2020, should the Supreme Court rule against 
partisan gerrymandering. The ruling will probably come too late to change the district maps in 
gerrymandered states before the 2018 elections, but that could happen in the two years before 
the next election and would definitely affect the process that follows the next census. If the 
Court continues to allow it partisan gerrymandering, I think an angle that could provide 
insight is to review if and how the First Amendment claims changed the justices’ opinions 
and whether that is a route to follow in future cases.  
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